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TEN YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION*
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL
William P. Cantwell received his
A.B. degree from Williams College
in 1942 and his LL.B from Yale Law
School in 1948. He was in practice
in New York until 1953 when he
moved to Colorado. He is active
in the American, Colorado, and
Denver Bar Associations and is a
member of the Denver firm of Hol-
land and Hart.
Even though the Revenue Act of 19481 first used the term and
enacted the concept into law, the true history of the "marital de-
duction" started in 1942. Before that year residents of community
property states enjoyed a very substantial advantage under federal
tax laws. In an effort to correct the situation Congress deprived
these people of their advantage in the field of estate and gift taxa-
tion by its 1942 legislation 2 although no change was made in the
income tax situation. It soon became apparent that a worthwhile
differential still existed in the income tax field, and that the con-
tinuation of the income tax advantage for residents of community
property states made it sufficiently attractive so that states which
had been common law property states were willing to change to a
community property system for the sole purpose of obtaining the
benefit of split income treatment on federal income taxation., As
a result of an extensive study, the Revenue Act of 1948 altered the
situation and extended the benefits of split income treatment to
residents of all states of the United States. At the same time, it
enacted into law a dramatic new concept of estate and gift taxa-
tion which has since become the single most important weapon in
the estate planner's arsenal. This was the "marital deduction." The
amendments were heralded as the adoption of a new national sys-
tem for ascertaining federal estate and gift tax liability 4 and at
least one court has taken the clear intent of Congress to have been
the equalization of estate tax results between community property
;states and common law states.'
* This article is based on ar address given at the 8th Annual University of Denver Tax Institute.
1 lt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e), added by 62 Stat. 117 (1948) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,§ 2056).2 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811, as amended, 56 Stat. 941 (1942).
S Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 51, 53 Stat. 27 (1939). Under community property law, one-half of
the earnings of either spouse is attributed to the other and must be taxed as such. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
5 Newton v. Wiseman, P-H Est. & Gift Tax Serv. 140,811 (W.D. Okla., July 22, 1958).
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Thus the original vista was the complete equalization of the
tax consequences of deaths and gifts in common law and commun-
ity property states. The extent to which this vista has been realized
has followed the typical pattern of practically every tax benefit con-
ferred by legislatures. This particular tax benefit has become a true
workhorse in the field of estate planning and to this extent the
vista of the 1948 legislation has been and is being realized, day in
and day out, throughout the country. To the extent that it has
failed of realization, these failures are due to the taxpayer's per-
ennial enemies of ingenuity on the part of revenue agents on the
one hand and careless, incompetent or unsophisticated draftsman-
ship and advice on the other.
It is noteworthy that there has been no legislative erosion, and
indeed, only legislative liberalization. In the Revenue Act of 19546
Congress took its first liberalizing steps and extended marital de-
duction benefits to situations in which a surviving spouse was ac-
corded appropriate rights over a fractional share of trust principal,7
thus abandoning the original requirement that a marital deduction
trust must be a separate trust in which no one else could have an
interest, in order to qualify." In addition, it permitted a marital
deduction for a legal life estate coupled with a general power of
appointment.9 Case law has indicated 10 that this power of appoint-
ment must be one over the remainder, rather than a mere lifetime
power of consumption. The second legislative liberalization occur-
red in 1958, when Congress made the liberalizing features of the
1954 legislation retroactive to April 1, 1948.11
Aside from legislative developments, however, the deduction
has been one more arena of conflict in the great unending match
of ingenuity between the Internal Revenue Service and the tax-
payer. The areas in which this conflict has developed represent the
true developments in the past ten years of experience with the
deduction, and the remaining inquiry spotlights a few of these areas
from the point of view of the literature, the case law, and the actual
experiences of banks and trust companies working in the field.
A. PROBLEMS INVOLVING FORMULA CLAUSES
The first and most persistent problem area has concerned for-
mula clauses. Whatever it is that a formula clause really is, there
are at least several things that it is not. For example, concern with
a formula clause and its use is not the same thing as concern with
whether a testator should plan his estate to take a maximum mari-
tal deduction. This question is really a prior question and no formu-
fa-clause question arises until someone decides, on the basis of ap-
propriate analysis of a particular estate, that the last penny of mari-
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), added by 62 Stat. 118 (1948).
9 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. I 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
10 Estate of McGehee, 28 T.C. 412 (1957).
11 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 18 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6634 (1958), amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 812(e)(1)(F), 62 Stat. 118 (1948). These changes apply to estates of de-
cedents dying after April 1, 1948, and before August 17, 1954. Refunds without interest are authorized




tal deduction is significant.12 This is a question which is ignored all
too frequently, for it is easy to overlook the fact that substantial dif-
ferences in tax brackets between the two spouses must exist before
it is imperative to obtain every last penny of marital deduction."
Neither is the formula clause question one of an outright disposition
as opposed to a trust disposition. A marital deduction gift, whether
formula or determined by other means, may be either outright or
in trust, although care must always be taken that the trust be quali-
fied for the deduction.
The formula clause is actually an ingenious development of
tax oriented practictioners, intended to achieve a qualification of
just that quantum of the decedent's adjusted gross estate which is
needed to obtain the maximum marital deduction and no more,
even though the exact amount will fluctuate right down to the
audit of the federal estate tax return because of changing values,
composition, transfers and other factors composing the gross estate.
14
One feature that no formula clause can correct is an "overqualifica-
tion" of assets. For example, if a testator gives his wife his entire
estate outright, he probably has "overqualified" assets passing to
his spouse by rendering the entire estate passing to her subject to
taxation at her death. The fact that a formula clause in and of itself
cannot correct this defect is a source of some criticism by those who
have indicated opposition to the use of such clauses.
Indeed, critics of the formula clause have developed a formid-
able case against its use."5 Some of the points they score are the
possibility of unconsciously passing all of the benefit of appreciation
of assets during administration to someone other than the surviving
spouse; frustration of intent when a formula clause operates in a
situation involving many non-probate assets which were not thought
to have been includible in the gross estate, such as gifts in contem-
plation of death, retained life interests, and the like; the possibility
of future changes in the law; the.fact that the actual amount of the
12 Durand, Draffmanship: Wills and Trusts, Proceedings, Probate and Trust Law Divisions of the
A.B.A. 70, 72 (1957).
13 Regarding the tax on various sized taxable estates (before deducting the $60,000 exemption),
only a 5% jump in brackets occurs between an estate of $160,000 and one of $810,000, and only a
7% jump occurs between $160,000 and $1,060,000. (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001). An estate of
$100,000 is actually in a 4.8% bracket since the first $60,000 is exempt and the next $40,000 is sub-
ject to a tax of $4800.
14 Bronston, Tax Problems of Formula Type of Marital Deduction Bequest, Proceedings, Probate
and Trust Law Divisions of the A.B.A. 96 (1957); Cox, Types of Marital Deduction Formula Clauses,
N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 909 (1957).
15 Trachtman, Estate Planning 35-41 (1958).
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gift being given by the testator is uncertain; and the possibility of
conflicts of interest between the surviving spouse and the fiduciary
and the residuary beneficiaries. In this latter area, for example, it
has been suggested that a surviving spouse might wish to argue
for a higher valuation of the gross estate since it would mean a
larger gift under a formula clause. It has also been suggested that,
for the same reason, she may argue to include certain inter vivos
transfers which might otherwise be excludible. It has also been
suggested that she may wish to argue for the use of administration
expenses in a way which would produce a greater overall tax bur-
den to the estate, but a larger marital deduction gift for her.16 One
interesting feature of all of these suggested conflicting interests is
that they assume that the surviving spouse and relatives of a dece-
dent who confers a marital deduction gift by the use of a formula
clause will fight among themselves. While this may be the unfor-
tunate fact in some cases, most draftsmen seem to take a more cheer-
ful outlook on such matters, and the facts seem to sustain them. The
revealing result of a survey of financial institutions' experience
with the deduction, discussed later in this paper, discloses no con-
flicts of interest in these areas in the administration of nearly two
thousand estates involving the marital deduction.









Without intending to deprecate the articulate and persuasive
arguments that have been made against the use of formula clauses,
it seems fair to suggest that the profession generally has not been
persuaded.1 7 The literature abounds with discussions of formula
clauses and very little of the current discussion is concerned with
the question of whether or not they should be used.' Rather, the
question has become: Which formula clause should be used - a
"'pecuniary formula," or a "fraction-of-the-residue" formula.
Historically the "pecuniary formula" was the earliest develop-
ment in the field.19 Its developers and early advocates preferred it
because it avoided a difficult problem of computing estate taxes in
a situation in which two mutually dependent indeterminants were
involved, 0 and in addition the idea prevailed that a marital deduc-
tion trust had to be completely separate and therefore created by
a separate article in the will, ahead of the residue. Unfortunately,
disadvantages soon appeared. Usually the pecuniary formula clause
had the effect of setting aside a pecuniary legacy, fixed in amount,
and not subject to fluctuation. As a result of this, if such a dollar
amount legacy was satisfied by distribution of assets which had
appreciated in value, a capital gain would be realized by the estate."
The second disadvantage was that any appreciation of assets
during the period of administration would not usually pass in satis-
faction of a pecuniary formula clause, but would instead pass to
residue. Obviously, the significance of this last disadvantage would
vary from case to case, depending upon who the beneficiaries might
be and how the property has been left among them. Certainly if
the wife herself is an income-tenant of a residuary trust which
would not again be subject to taxation at her death, it would be
preferable to avoid appreciation of the marital deduction share and
to permit appreciation to go to the residuary trust. On the other
hand, in a situation in which a marital deduction gift was one to a
second wife while the residuary, beneficiaries were children of a
first marriage, some antagonism might be anticipated. Under these
circumstances, difficulties might very well be avoided if the widow
and the children shared equally in appreciation, rather than having
substantially all of it go to one set of such beneficiaries. And finally,
appreciation may be desirable and even usual, but depreciation of
assets during administration has been an occasional-if unfortunate
-fact, and in addition, some estates will consist largely of debt-type
investment which will vary little in value during administration.
Concern about these disadvantages of the pecuniary type for-
mula clause resulted in the development of what has come to be
71 Durand, supra note 12, at 70.
18 E.g., Bowe, Estate Planning and Taxation 99-103 (student ed. 1957); Casner, Estate Planning
640-51 (2d ed. 1956); Shattuck and Farr, An Estate Planner's Handbook § 52 (2d ed. 1953); Bronston,
supra note 14; Cox, supra note 14; Golden, A Decade with the Marital Deduction, 97 Trusts and Estates
304, 305 (1958).
19 Golden, supra note 18, at 304-05.
20 Ibid.
21 Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), off'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 573 (1936); Rev. Rul. 270, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 325.
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called a "fraction-of-the-residue" clause. 22 This is a clause specifi-
cally developed to answer the problems discovered in applying
pecuniary clauses. Since a fraction-of-the-residue clause merely
measures out a fractional participation in whatever is left after all
other dispositive provisions of the will are satisfied, it participates in
appreciation (and in depreciation as well!). In addition, satisfac-
tion of this clause will not result in any capital gain to the estate,
since no specific dollar amount is being satisfied with appreciated
assets.
Some of the other advantages which have been recited in favor
of a fraction-of-the-residue formula gift include solution of the
problem of allocation of income received during administration.
Since a trust gift which is intended to procure the maximum deduc-
tion will ordinarily require that the wife receive all the income
from and after death 2 anything which will insure that the trust
participates in its pro-rata share of income without the necessity
for complicated calculations of such income will be beneficial. In
addition the fraction-of-the-residue clause has been described as
easier to understand than the pecuniary formula clause. Testators
have traditionally dealt in terms of fractional shares of the residue,
but they have only come to formula-type phraseology since the
Revenue Act of 1948 and seem generally slower to grasp it than
they do the concept of a fractional share of the residue.
The use of a fractional share of the residue clause will not nec-
essarily solve the problem of the interrelationship between the
amount of the deduction and the death taxes, unless the will directs
that taxes are to be paid out of assets other than the surviving
spouse's share.24 While computations to solve such an interrelated
problem are admittedly difficult and complex, they are certainly
not insoluble, and if substantial other benefits come from the use of
such a clause, the deterring effect of such tax calculations should
not rule the determination of which type of clause to use, even
though a testator may want his surviving spouse to bear her ap-
portionable share of death taxes.25
The fact of the matter is that both types of clauses can be ex-
ceptionally useful. If a draftsman is confronted with a situation
in which it would not be good estate planning for a spouse to obtain
the benefits of appreciation of assets, a pecuniary formula may very
well be the solution of the problem. Such a situation would defi-
nitely exist, for example, where there were no children and the
surviving spouse obtained the income benefits from a trust as to
the second half of the estate as well as the income from the marital
deduction portion. Since the taxes on the second half of the estate
would have been paid at the death of the first spouse, and since the
second half would not again be subject to taxation, then apprecia-
22 Loveil, Administering the Marital Deduction-A Summary of Five Years' Experience, 92 Trusts
& Estates 812 (1953).
23 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8), (9) (1958); Special Ruling 9-20-57, 2 CCH Est. & Gift Tax Rep.
8127, 1958 P-H Fed. Tax Serv. 140,456 stated that the marital deduction would not be lost
because of a provision in the will that income received during administration (including income
from property passing to the surviving spouse) should be used for expenses of administration, but
that the marital deduction would be reduced by the amount of income so expended.
24 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958).




tion would be desirable in such second half, while it would be
equally desirable to keep the marital deduction trust invested in
assets which were not expected to appreciate, and to first charge any
necessary principal distributions against such trust. Under these
circumstances, a good case would exist for the use of a pecuniary
type formula which would tend to limit the use of appreciated
assets to satisfy the marital deduction gift.
In addition, it is submitted that the capital gains problem which
would ordinarily exist in satisfying a pecuniary formula gift with
appreciated assets can in itself be solved by careful attention to the
wording of the controlling instrument. Just how significant such
wording can be is demonstrated by a recent series of cases which
discuss in detail the question of whether or not a particular form
of phraseology requires or permits satisfaction with appreciated
assets.2 6 The problem that arose in these cases is similar to prob-
lems that will probably continue to arise in marital deduction cases
which use language relating to certain standards of "value" to be
followed, without indicating whether such standards of value refer
,only to determination of the dollar-value of a pecuniary formula
gift, or whether they also refer to the value-standard to be used in
making distributions to satisfy that gift. The general rule is that
distributions from estates are to be valued at the date of distribu-
tion. Questions raised by pecuniary formula clauses demonstrate
that draftsmen have not always made it clear whether they intend-
ed to change this rule for distribution purposes, or whether the
language they used about value-standards applied only to the quan-
tum of the gift, and otherwise left the general rule in force as to
distributions.
In the Kantner case 27 for example, the language in the pecun-
iary formula clause stated that "all values shall be those finally de-
termined for federal estate tax purposes." At issue in the case was
the meaning and application of this phrase. The executor contended
that the phrase meant that the stock which was to be distributed
in satisfaction of the pecuniary gift should be valued for distribution
purposes at the value actually set in the federal estate tax return,
regardless of an increase in value on the actual date of distribution.
A guardian ad litem for minor children resisted this application,
and contended that the shares should be valued for distribution
purposes at the higher market value they had on the actual date
of distribution. An acceptance of this position would decrease the
number of shares required to be distributed in satisfaction of the
pecuniary gift and thereby penalize the surviving spouse. It would
correspondingly increase the amount going to the trust for the min-
ors. The court agreed with the guardian's position, and required
that the shares be valued, for purposes of distribution, at date of dis-
tribution value, and held that the language in the pecuniary form-
ula clause did not relate to distribution values but only to values
used to determine the quantum of the pecuniary amount.
26 Estate of Kantner, 50 N.J. Super. 582, 143 A.2d 243 (App. Div. 1958); In re Bush's Will, 2
App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 167 N.E.2d 927 (1957); Estate of Jeph-
son, 1956 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. City, Nov. 13, 1956).
27 Estate of Kantner, supra note 26.
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In Jephson 2 the analogous language was: "All values shall be
determined as of the date of my death." Here the court held that
the testator wished to avoid capital gains tax and therefore that the
shares should be valued at the date of death value for distribution
purposes, even though they had appreciated at the actual date of
distribution. Consequently, a more substantial number of shares
would pass in satisfaction of the pecuniary formula gift than would
have been the case had the Jephson court followed the same rea-
soning as the Kantner court. In the third case, In re Bush's Will,",
the language required distribution of the securities "at the ap-
praised values thereof" and the court found an intent similar to
that in the Jephson case.
The type of problem that can arise in this area can be illustrat-
ed by an example. It can be assumed that a testator uses a pecuni-
ary formula, and that the formula requires a marital deduction gift
with a dollar value of $100,000. Assume also that at the date of'
death there are 100 shares of the X corporation worth $100,000 and
100 shares of the Y corporation also worth $100,000. At the date of
distribution, the 100 shares of X have increased in value to $150,000
and the 100 shares of Y have decreased in value to $50,000. Adop-
tion of different value concepts may alter completely the share dis--
tributed in satisfaction of the $100,000 pecuniary gift from $50,000
28 Estate of Jephson, 1956 N.Y.L.J. 8 (Surr. Ct., N.Y. City, Nov. 13, 1956).
29 In re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 167
N.E.2d 927 (1957). The court applied date of death values in measuring the value of securities to.
be distributed, these values having been selected by the executor for estate tax appraisal pur-
poses. The court further required that the executor distribute appreciated securities in such a way-
that the widow and the residuary legatees share in these securities proportionately.
Today's biggest bargain in complete research! Complete answers
to your everyday problems for only 30 cents-that's the average cost
of an annotation in any current volume of ALR2d. The annotation
gives the controlling law and facts and holdings of all cases on
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to $150,000-a very considerable swing. If, for example, it could be
argued that the valuation language in the will permitted the execu-
tor to distribute at date of death values, he could distribute either
the $50,000 of Y, in which event the widow would actually get some-
thing which was worth $50,000 less than the amount required by
her pecuniary formula at the time of receipt, or she could get $150,-
000 worth of X, which would in effect allocate appreciation in sat-
isfaction of the pecuniary formula. Some commentators have been
considerably concerned about the use of clauses which would permit
such possibilities, particularly with reference to the possibility of
the distribution of assets with a value, at the distribution date, be-
low the amount called for in the formula.30 They have suggested, as
a matter of caution, that it would be well to include a proviso, if
date of death values are actually being used for distribution pur-
poses, which would require the executor to distribute property
which was worth, on the date of distribution, at least as much as the
dollar value required by the pecuniary formula. To do otherwise,
they suggest, would be to endanger the marital deduction."
In summary, the area of the marital deduction formula clause
is a potential problem area, much as any other area of complex
drafting is. Many problems could be avoided by diligent analysis
of the particular problems and desires of a testator and by meticu-
lous use of language which specifically covers the known problem
areas. To do less is to invite serious and irremediable difficulty.
VARIANTS FOR OBTAINING A MARITAL DEDUCTION OF THE "RIGHT"
AMOUNT.
Adequate planning may often require that something less than
a maximum marital deduction should be taken. Draftsmen have
been concerned with this problem, since it is certainly not solved
by a formula clause alone. Some of the ideas developed can be used
either with or without formula clauses for obtaining or attempting
to obtain maximum tax benefits in this area. For example, one au-
thor has suggested the possibility of setting forth multiple gifts in
the will. 32 Under such a plan, a testator could offer his surviving
spouse a choice of fifteen per cent of his estate outright, thirty per
cent of his estate in trust with a right to draw on the principal, or
fifty per cent in trust with a testamentary power of appointment.
3 3
The multiple gift idea has been one of fairly recent development
and therefore has not yet attracted widespread attention. However,
it may have particular usefulness in situations in which the value
of the estate is so volatile that precise pre-death planning is diffi-
cult. Whether it is preferable to a formula clause will depend upon
the apprehension of the draftsman as to the problems inherent in
the use of the formula clause, and on other factors such as the in-
cludibility of inter vivos transfers. Certainly if the multiple gift
idea is used, it should be coupled with a provision which would re-
quire that the executor distribute something absolutely to the sur-
viving spouse if no choice has been made within six months after
30 Casner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 648-51; Cox, supro note 14, at 930-32.
31 Ibid.




death. For if a spouse is required to make a choice and fails to do
so within the six-month period, 34 it would appear that it might be
very difficult to protect the estate's right to any marital deduction,
unless she was sure to get something even if she made no choice.
One other post-mortem possibility which has occasioned atten-
tion is the use of partial disclaimers to whittle down the amount
qualified for the marital deduction in a situation in which post-
mortem conditions make this desirable.3 5 The new federal gift tax
regulations appear to throw draftsmen back to conditions of their
state law to determine whether or not a partial disclaimer may in-
volve a taxable gift,36 which is a considerable advance over the ten-
tative regulations, which were very affirmative in indicating that
such a partial disclaimer would in fact be taxable as a gift.37 Cer-
tainly if local law permits a disclaimer 38 and if the conditions of lo-
cal law are such that a partial disclaimer would not result in a tax-
able gift, it is quite evident that this may be a particularly useful
tool in situations where the exact composition of the estate of a sur-
viving spouse as well as the taxable estate of a deceased spouse can
only be realistically appraised after the death of the first of them.
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND GIFTS IN TRUST
Within the first ten years of experience with the marital deduc-
tion, a considerable amount of litigation has been developed with
respect to trusts. Basically, two types of trusts are possible under
the regulations. The most widely used is the power of appointment
trust, under which the surviving spouse is given all income for life,
payable annually or more frequently, with a power of appointment
over the corpus in favor of herself or her estate, exercisable by her
alone and in all events, and with no power of appointment over the
trust in any other person.3 9  The second type of trust is the "estate
trust"4 0 which is a trust which is coupled with a vested remainder
in the surviving spouse's estate. The estate trust has been recom-
mended as useful in situations where there are non-income produc-
ing assets, since it is felt that it will qualify under such circum-
stances, while qualification of a power of appointment trust would
be open to question, since it requires that the widow receive all of
34 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3 (1958).
33 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(d)-i (1958); Cosner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 659-61.







37 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(.) (1957).
38 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-5-44 (Supp. 1957). "Disclaimer. Any person who may be entitled to
receive any property . . . under a devise, bequest . . . shall have the right to disclaim irrevocably
the whole or any part of such property . . . . Any property . . . so disclaimed shall pass . . .
as if the person disclaiming had predeceased such decedent .. ."
39Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(o) (1958) sets forth the requirements for a power of appoint-
ment trust as follows:
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from the entire interest
or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion of all the income from the entire
interest.
(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be payable annually or at more fre-
quent intervals.
(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or the specific
portion to either herself or her estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her alone and (whether exer-
cisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in al events.
(5) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject to a power in any other
person to appoint any part to any person other than the surviving spouse.
40 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(b) (1958); Bowe, op. cit. supro note 18, at 92-93; Cosner, Estate
*Planning under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1949).
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the income for life,41 and further requires her to have power to
cause the assets to be made income producing.
The main area of dispute with respect to power of appointment
trusts concerns the actual power of appointment given to the spouse.
Here there have been a number of cases, and they appear to turn
largely on provisions of state law regarding the scope of a power
conferred.42 For drafting purposes, the most significant item to re-
member regarding a power of appointment is the specific language
of the regulations 4 which provide that the surviving spouse must
have a power of appointment "exercisable in favor of herself or her
estate and exercisable alone and in all events." Attempting to cavil
with these requirements by restricting a power of appointment has
been the most important factor which has given rise to litigation in
the field of marital deduction trusts.
4 4
In addition to problems with respect to the powers of appoint-
ment, the creation of marital deduction trusts involves certain other
drafting problems. For example, a wife may die between income
periods. In such a situation, a draftsman will be safe in being silent
about the use of income collected during the last period and never
paid to the wife while living, if he is certain as to the status of his
"local law. '45 On the other hand, if he cannot firmly convince him-
self as to what the local law may be on the disposition of such in-
come, it is a simple matter for him to insert a phrase in the will
subjecting this income to the wife's power of appointment.
Another area which requires penetrating analysis of the assets
of an estate at the planning stage is that in which a marital deduc-
tion formula gift is made in trust, with no recognition of the fact
that many non-probate assets may make this a very small, or in-
deed, a dry trust. Such a disposition would be inefficient, and could
be avoided in most cases where it might be present by simply pro-
viding for an outright gift if the gift did not meet a certain dollar
limit, with a trust transfer if it did exceed such a limit.
Use of a power of appointment trust raises certain questions
with respect to taxation in the surviving spouse's estate and also
with respect to the exercise of the power of appointment. In many
41 Casner, supra note 40, at 101.
42 Commissioner v. Ellis' Estate, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958) ("power of invasion in widow
. . . she to be the sole judge .... " Held: Not equivalent to o fee simple and not qualified as
r wer of appointment trust.); Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957) (Widow
ad power "to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and principal . . . in her uncontrolled
discretion." Held: Under New York low, this is not equivalent to a fee simple interest and is not
qualified for the marital deduction.); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955) (Power
to invade corpus would be lost in event of widow's legal incapacity or upon appointment of
guardian. Held: Power not exercisable in all events.); Dexter v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 442
(D. Mass. 1958) (Testator "authorized and empowered" trustee to make payments for benefit of
widow. Held: Trustee could refuse to make a payment requested by the widow and trust does
not qualify.); Matteson v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y. 1956) (Will gave widow a
power to invade corpus if trust income was insufficient, of which the widow would be the sole
judge. Held: Disqualified for the marital deduction because insufficiency of income was a condi-
tion to exercise of the power to invade.); Estate of Allen, 29 T.C. No. 52 (1957) (Testamentary
power "to appoint as the widow sees fit" did not qualify as a power of appointment trust be-
cause of Maryland decisions limiting a testamentary power to a special power of appointment.).
43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g) (1958).
44 Cases cited note 42 supra.
45 Treos. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(8) provides that it is sufficient if trust income not distributed
to the wife is accumulated and subject to the wife's power of appointment.
SACHS-LAWLOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS-RLPInE 5-3422
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states, a residuary clause will automatically exercise a power of ap-
pointment, unless there is an affirmative showing of intent to avoid
exercise of the power. Under these circumstances, the assets of a
power of appointment trust could be subjected to an additional set
of administration expenses, even though they might pass under the
residuary clause of the surviving spouse's will to the same persons
who would be the takers in default if the power was not exercised.
In addition, since the assets of a power of appointment trust will be
includible in the estate of the surviving spouse if she does not dis-
pose of them during life, it is incumbent upon the draftsman to
ascertain whether or not death taxes attributable to such assets can
be paid from other assets of such surviving spouse, or whether some
provision for apportionment of taxes to the corpus of the power of
appointment trust should be included in the surviving spouse's will.
To overlook this could wipe out the surviving spouse's probate
estate which might unduly penalize beneficiaries preferred by that
spouse over takers in default under the first decedent's will, or
might, if brought to the attention of the surviving spouse, result in
an exercise of the power of appointment which might not be other-
wise desirable because of state death tax consequences or otherwise.
GENERAL MARITAL DEDUCTION DRAFTING PROBLEMS
There is a series of general drafting problems raised by the use
of a marital deduction, whether the gift passes outright or in trust.
One of these involves the allocation of the burden of taxes, and re-
quires a new analysis of how the burden should be allocated. This
is because any taxes which are payable out of the marital deduction
share will reduce that share and correspondingly raise the taxes."6
An entirely different set of results will 6btain in a situation in
which taxes are apportioned to the marital deduction share from
one in which they are not. For example, in a $300,000 estate, if the
wife takes a $150,000 marital deduction, and if the taxes are paid out
of the other half, then the federal estate tax is $17,500. If they are
payable out of both halves equally, then the tax is $20,163.17. Con-
sequently, it is incumbent upon the draftsman to review such prob-
lems with the testator and to ascertain which of these two results
seems preferable to him. No stock answer will apply in all situa-
tions, since testators will have varying ideas as to whom they wish
to favor.
46 U.S. Treas. Pub. 210, supro note 25; Cosner, op. cit. supra note 18, at 651-55.
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Another problem which has arisen in a number of cases is the
tax result of an election by the surviving spouse. There is a wide-
spread conflict among the various states here, 7 and every drafts-
man must canvass his own situation to determine what the effect of
an election would be. While an attempt might be made to regulate
the burden of taxes in the event of an election, it would certainly
be a courageous individual who would predict the success of such
an attempt. Consequently, the best thing that can be done is to sim-
ply make the testator aware of the possible tax consequences of an
election and to suggest to him that his liquidity problems and other
administrative and dispositive desires will depend on such a con-
tingency.
The requirement in a power of appointment trust that the wife
receive all of the income from and after the testator's death has
caused most draftsmen to use phraseology which would make this
possible. However, should there be any affirmative indications in
an instrument that this result was not desired during the period of
administration then it would appear that the deduction proper
would not necessarily be lost, but that it would be reduced .4
Another area of concern is that of the distribution of nonquali-
fying assets to satisfy a marital deduction gift. If there are non-
qualifying assets in a testator's estate, section 2056 of the 1954 code
provides that if they may be used to satisfy the marital deduction
gift, they will reduce it by a pro-rata share which is deemed to pass
to the marital deduction gift by an application of a "marital deduc-
tion conduit theory," in the absence of language preventing the sat-
isfaction of the gift with nonqualifying assets. Consequently, wheth-
er the distribution is to be outright or in trust, good draftsmanship
would appear to require phraseology which would affirmatively
prevent the satisfaction of the marital share with assets which are
not qualified for the marital deduction.
Considerable discussion has arisen regarding survivorship and
simultaneous death clauses, and there has been litigation in the
field as well.4 9 In this area, the draftsman and planner must first
decide whether or not he is interested in the marital deduction in
any event, or whether he only wants the deduction if the surviving
spouse should survive for a considerable period. In approaching
this question, an analysis must be made of both estates. Even
though both estates may have substantial assets, if there is a wide
gap in ages, or if the spouses are young, there is certainly a better
statistical possibility that the surviving spouse would survive for
some considerable length of time and therefore that the yield on
the estate tax money saved by the use of the marital deduction
would be a significant factor over the period of survivorship. In
these situations, it would appear to be desirable to spin out the sur-
47 Estate of Jaeger, 27 T.C. 863 (1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958). Under local low, taxes
attributable to property passing to the surviving spouse are apportioned to her share of the
estate. Contra, Street v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957); Estate of Babcock v. Commis-
sioner, 234 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1956); Hamrick v. Pitts, 135 F. Supp. 835 (W.D.S.C.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 486
(4th Cir. 1955). Under local law, the share of the estate passing to the surviving spouse should bear
no portion of federal estate tax.
48 See note 23 supra.
49 Smith v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1957); Estate of Steele v. United States,
146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956); California Trust Co. v. Riddell, 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1956);
Kellar v. Kasper, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1956).
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vivorship requirement to the maximum period of six months by use
of a "time clause."5 Since yield on tax money saved is the basic
thing at stake, the longer the postponement the more likely the
long-range survival which would make the yield a significant fac-
tor. In other situations, in which the marital deduction is desired
regardless of the time of survivorship, since an overall tax saving
would be made in both estates so long as the substantial estate own-
er is the first decedent, then the only sensible clause is a "survivor-
ship clause" which injects a presumption that the spouse with the
small estate survives, in the absence of proof to the contrary21
With respect to the administration expenses involved in the
use of survivorship clauses which would pass estates through two
administrations, it is often asserted that a double dose of admini-
stration expenses will be payable if a survivorship clause is used.
This is not necessarily true in the case of a power of appointment
trust, since its assets would not enter the probate estate of the
spouse with the power of appointment, unless such spouse exercised
it in favor of his or her estate. Consequently, a second set of ex-
penses on such a trust as a part of the surviving spouse's probate
estate would not be present.
A SURVEY OF ACTUAL ExPF RicE-1948-1958
In. the interest of obtaining a sampling of experience with the
actual administration of the marital deduction, a survey was taken
in connection with the preparation of this discussion. The survey
was based upon an analogous survey which was conducted after
five years of experience With the deduction in 1953.52 Similar ques-
tions were asked, although the present survey was limited in its
geographic ambit to banks and trust companies in the western
part of the United States, with particular emphasis on the Rocky
Mountain states.
The following description of the questions asked and the re-
sponses, with certain notes from the institutions responding, re-
ports this survey. The questionnaire was sent to twenty-six banks
and trust companies. They were first asked how many estates in-
volving the marital deduction they had administered. The total
sampling involved in their responses was 1956 estates. They were
50 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056-b(3) (1958).
51 Bowe, Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts, Proceedings, Probate and Trust Law Divisions of the
A.B.A. 25-28 (1955).
%2 Lovel, supra note 22.
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next asked how many estate tax audits had been completed, and it
developed that only 361 of the 1956 estates, or 18.35 per cent, were
still open.
In an effort to determine how many difficulties existed in these
estates as a result of the use of the marital deduction, the banks
were asked to describe what difficulties they had had. They report-
ed difficulties in only thirty-three estates, or 1.7 per cent of all of
the estates, as a. result of the use of the marital deduction. One of
the institutions responding to this question pointed out, as an ex-
ample of the kind of difficulties encountered, that in a particular
case an agent had gone into questions such as the production of in-
come, payment of dividends on closely held family stock, long term
leases, and the administration of the trust. Another bank respond-
ed as follows:
"Since I have been with the Bank, the Federal Field
Agents have not gone beyond their traditional interests in
assets and deductions and have not been concerned with
the way the estate has been administered and what has
been used to satisfy the marital share. I recall one case dur-
ing my years with the Internal Revenue Service wherein
they were interested in what was used to satisfy the mari-
tal share. I do not recall the exact facts, but they are sub-
stantially as follows: H and W had entered into an ante-
nuptial agreement; by his Will H left his entire estate to the
children of his prior marriage. About the only asset re-
maining in H's estate after the payment of his debts, ex-
penses, and taxes, was stock in X Corporation, a closely-
held corporation which was valued at $300,000-the adjust-
ed gross estate; W filed her election to take against H's
Will; the children of H filed their objection to W's election
and relied on the antenuptial agreement; finally, W sold her
one-half interest in X Company stock to H's children for
$75,000 and simultaneously H's children withdrew their ob-
jections to W's election to take against the Will. The mari-
tal deduction was limited to $75,000 (the amount which W
received upon the sale of her interest in the stock of X
Company) instead of one-half of the adjusted gross estate
($150,000). I am informed that the local office often re-
quires assurance as to what assets comprise the marital de-
duction trusts where individuals are acting as sole trus-
tees. However, we have had no such difficulty."
Still a third reported:
"I can only recall one estate in which the marital de-
duction, as such, occasioned the federal audit's difficulties.
This arose in a situation where trusts were set up long be-
fore the marital deduction was ever heard of and the wid-
ow had power to draw down the proceeds of the sale of the
assets of one-half of the trust. The problem was the indi-
visibility of the trust, and, as you know, the technical
amendments act of 1958 may make it possible for us to
claim a refund on this score, in view of the fact that there
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is one year in which to file claims for refund where the
trusts were not divided by the specific provisions of the in-
struments concerned."
Another one pointed out that:
"Our local Federal Estate Tax Examiner is inclined to
go beyond the checking of assets and deductions where
marital deduction is involved in some instances. Several
years ago in the matter of the estate which was not han-
dled by our trust department he had the income tax de-
partment assess a large capital gain tax on assets delivered
to satisfy the marital deductions which was computed as a
dollar amount and the assets during that particular period
of administration had advanced to a considerable extent
over the date of death values used for the Federal Estate
Tax Return."
However, answers like these must be read against the statistic
of only 1.7 per cent having any difficulty whatsoever, as well as en-
couraging answers like that from still another bank which said:
"We did not have any difficulties in making the settle-
ment with the Federal authorities. In fact, the field agents
and the examiners have been very helpful and have seemed
to lean over backwards to help us settle any questions in
this regard. This has been true whether or not clauses de-
signed to make sure that a trust would qualify were in the
Will."
The next question asked was whether or not agents had gone
beyond their traditional interest in assets and deductions and had
concerned themselves with how the estate had been administered
and what had been used to satisfy the marital share. Only three of
the twenty-six banks, or 11.5 per cent of those responding, indicated
that this had ever occurred.
With regard to the deduction generally, the banks were asked
whether or not a series of protective clauses which were intended
to affirmatively safeguard the marital deduction were significant in
qualifying marital deduction gifts. Eight of the twenty-six banks
answered this question affirmatively. As to formula clauses them-
Expert * Commercial Printing
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selves, the banks were asked the number of cases in which such
clauses had caused actual administrative difficulty. Surprisingly,
such difficulties have apparently been caused in only fifteen of the
1956 estates, or about .8 per cent. Some of the banks commented
about the types of difficulties being encountered, pointing out that:
"We have had several instances in which the marital
deduction has caused some administrative difficulties, such
as in determining the matter of the income to which the
widow is entitled when her share is not determined until
late in the administration, and a question as to allocation of
assets; i.e., whether the marital trust must contain a frac-
tional interest in each and every asset. However, in each
case the matter has been worked out satisfactorily with all
parties concerned, and usually has been a matter of mathe-
matics more than anything else. We have been recom-
mending to attorneys that clauses be inserted to avoid these
difficulties, particularly with regard to how the marital gift
is satisfied so that, for instance, the trustees may satisfy
the marital trust in any manner deemed to the best in-
terests of the estate without the necessity of assigning
fractional interests so long as qualified assets are used."
And again:
"As a side light you might be interested in a situation
which we anticipate will come up from time to time, and
has already come up here, as to the effect on the marital
deduction when we select to use administration expenses
as a deduction for income tax purposes rather than federal
estate tax purposes, which I would say is almost always the
case where a marital deduction is involved because of the
low federal estate tax rate. A question has arisen as to
whether our election to so treat administration expenses
will increase, in effect, the value of the marital trust. In
the one case here where this has been of significance, the
matter was settled by agreement, and it was determined:
"(1) That the value of the marital trust would be de-
termined as though the deduction had been taken for fed-
eral estate tax purposes even though they were actually
taken as income tax deductions; and
"(2) That the income beneficiaries, including the wid-
ow, would have to reimburse corpus to the extent that the
federal estate tax was increased. Even with these adjust-
ments the election still proved very beneficial. I think also
there are cases along these lines, at least as to the reim-
bursement by the income beneficiaries."
The banks were next asked whether or not they preferred the
use of a "formula" marital deduction clause. Eighteen answered an
unqualified "yes," two a qualified "yes," one indicated no prefer-
ence, and four of the banks indicated that they did not prefer the
use of such a clause. They were next asked whether or not they
preferred a "pecuniary" clause or a "fraction of the residue" clause.
79.2 per cent of the banks prefer the fractional clause, while 20.8
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per cent prefer the pecuniary clause. One of them pointed out a
valuable practice in stating that:
"We have been reviewing Wills very carefully when
filed with us and have been insisting on necessary changes
so we have not had a serious situation involving incomplete
or defective qualification clauses."
In attempting to canvass the suggestions made by opponents of
formula clauses regarding efforts by surviving spouses to alter the
administration of the estate in a way which would favor them, the
banks were asked whether or not they had encountered situations
in which the surviving spouse had urged the election of the federal
optional valuation which would result in a larger federal estate tax
in order that her marital share would be bigger. Only one out of
the twenty-six indicated that this had ever occurred, and they point-
ed out that the consideration of it had been at their suggestion in a
single instance, and not at the surviving spouse's suggestion. That
bank pointed out that it was rejected after such consideration, and
that the bank felt that even if an attempt was made by itself along
these lines, that the other beneficiaries could probably raise serious
objection. They would recommend insertion of appropriate clauses
covering the situation.
The next question concerned the type of clause preferred re-
garding date of distribution value as against date of death value in
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satisfying a pecuniary gift. The banks were asked whether or not
they preferred one or the other of these and 41 per cent indicated
that they preferred a clause which would authorize distribution at
date of distribution values, while 59 per cent indicated a preference
for a clause authorizing distribution at date of death .or federal
estate tax values.
Finally, the banks were asked whether or not fewer problems
had developed regarding the marital deduction than anticipated.
Not all banks answered this question, but of those which did, only
9 per cent indicated that more questions had developed than they
had anticipated. Some of the comments here are equally interest-
ing in giving the point of view of institutions actually involved in
administering the marital deduction. For example, the following
are typical:
"We have encountered much less difficulty with regard
to the marital deduction than we anticipated. Perhaps this
is chiefly due to the interest and industry of our Bar Asso-
ciations and individual attorneys in finding out how to
properly draft marital deduction Wills. I might mention
that we have three men in our Estate Planning Division
who have been kept busy on Estate Planning work through-
out the state for a number of years. They do not ring any
doorbells and make no "cold calls" but work only on refer-
ences from attorneys, underwriters, C.P.A.'s, etc. Their first
objective is to get the prospect to an attorney, and we have
had wonderful cooperation from attorneys who were glad
to learn about trust administration, even though it might
be an entirely new field to them. The marital deduction
seems to have generated a tremendous and lasting 'em-
phasis on trust administration and probate practice in gen-
eral among the State Bar."
Again:
"Generally, the larger estates that we have handled
have been complicated by the marital deduction, and par-
ticularly Estate Planning, in the larger brackets, has de-
veloped severe problems. The particular area that has been
brought to our attention, due to the impact of the marital
deduction, involves those wishing to provide properly for
their families and their interests who are not compelled to
seek a tax solution rather than an economic and a personal
solution.
"In commenting, I feel the governmental function of
taxes for revenue purposes has been so distorted in the
estate tax field that it is no longer recognizable."
And finally:
"Generally we have had very few difficulties develop
in Federal audits. In this state the Federal agents are cur-
rently disallowing the spouse's award as a qualifying mari-
tal deduction. There are several cases pending in the
courts and we will probably have a decision fairly soon.
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Meanwhile there exists some uncertainty as to the proper
payment to be made under a formula type of legacy. Life
insurance and modes of settlement have proved trouble-
some in connection with some Federal audits.
"The primary problems that have arisen to date are in
the administration rather than in the tax field. The for-
mula type of will adds to the complexity of the administra-
tion and results in more paper work. The computations as
to income and principal and allocation of securities are
more involved. Other difficulties arise out of the use of
elective deductions during the probate period and the con-
sideration of possible adjustments between principal and
income. A longer period of administration is also an un-
desirable feature of formula marital deductions."
CONCLUSION
No economic step in a commercial society which can alter the
flow of hundreds of millions of dollars can be perfectly achieved
from its inception. The marvel of the marital deduction, which has
such a role, is that so few serious difficulties have developed. This
is at once a tribute to advisors and administrators, and a source of
confidence in the basic workability of the "new system" of taxa-
tion. If all tax changes of equal impact were as well conceived, in-
terpreted and administered, we should be a nation of more com-
fortable taxpayers, if such an anomaly can exist!
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INFANCY- SHIELD OR SWORD?
By E. R. ARCHAMBEAU, JR.
An infant enjoys a unique status in the eyes of the law. Though
he is under certain legal disabilities, the law has deemed it wise to
grant him certain legal privileges. Most of these legal disabilities
and privileges stem from the common law and have long been rec-
ognized in the courts. In more recent times many of these disabili-
ties and privileges have been codified in the statutes of most states.
Consequently, it might be said that the infant is in a legal limbo.
He is precluded from voting, holding public office, making a will, or
suing in his own name. Privileges granted to infants include the
general right to void his unwanted contracts, with certain limita-
tions. On the other hand, an infant may be held criminally liable
for his criminal delicts if he has reached an age of legal discretion.
The infant is also liable for his torts substantially to the same ex-
tent as an adult.
The protection which the law accords infants in their contracts
is one of their more strongly enforced and more valuable priv-
ileges. Certain rules applying to infants and their contract rights
have become axiomatic. It is universally recognized that, as a gen-
eral rule, an infant's contract is voidable unless it be made for cer-
tain necessaries or the infant himself reaffirms or ratifies it after
attaining majority. As with any general rule of law, specific fact sit-
uations have made certain exceptions necessary. The purpose of
this note is to outline the exceptions which the law has made in
instances where an infant, through a fraudulent misrepresentation
of his age, has induced another party to contract with him.
A question concerning such a contract was recently presented
to the Colorado Supreme Court in Doenges-Long Motor Company
v. Gillen,' in which the infant fraudulently misrepresented his age
in order to induce the company to sell him a car. After reaching
his majority, the plaintiff returned the car, ,announced that he was
disaffirming the contract, and demanded the return of his down
payment and the cash equivalent of his old car, which had been
sold following its trade-in. The court held that the infant had an
absolute right to disaffirm his contract and that he must be restored
to his status as it had been at the time of making the contract. The
court further held, however, that because of his fraudulent misrep-
resentation, the injured party was entitled to those damages result-
ing directly and proximately from the infant's tortious acts.
THE STATUS OF THE INFANT IN TORT AND CONTRACT
The question presented in Doenges-Long is more sophisticated
than one pertaining simply to the venerable general rule permitting
minors to disaffirm their contracts at will unless they be for neces-
saries. Mr. Justice Hall, in his presentation of the unanimous opin-
1328 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1958).
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ion of the court in Doenges-Long, reaffirmed this general rule. This
view was also followed in the only other similar case to, be found
in Colorado. The court in Mosko v. Forsythe2 held that an infant
has an absolute and paramount right to repudiate his contracts. This
right is coupled with the infant's right to be returned to his original
status as if the contract had never been made.
In contrast to the general rule of law exempting minors from
responsibility for unwanted- contracts, there is the equally ancient
rule that minors are liable for their tortious acts to the same exent
as an adult. These two diverse rules are usually distinguished by
reason of the freedom of choice exercised by the other contracting
party who voluntarily assumes the risk that the minor may later
repudiate his contract. This is manifestly not the case where one is
injured by the tortious act of a minor, since the damaged party is
unable to avoid the consequences of the minor's wrongful act.
The court, in Slayton v. Barry,3 took cognizance of the general
rules pertaining to the rights and liabilities of minors in both tort
and contract. The court refused to hold the infant liable for a con-
tract which he had procured by a fraudulent misrepresentation of
age, since to do so would violate the rule pertaining to contracts of
a minor. The dominant consideration, the court felt, is not that of
liability for torts which an infant may commit, but rather of pro-
tection from their improvident contracts.
It is apparent, as pointed out in the Slayton case, that there is
a conflict between the general rules of law applicable to the torts
and contracts of infants. The principal problems posed in such a
dilemma, as found in Doenges-Long and many other such cases, are
the questions of the infant's right of disaffirmance where the con-
tract was fraudulently induced by the infant; and secondly, what
rights and duties are to be granted to the parties should disaffir-
mance be permitted. It is indeed unusual that Doenges-Long is a
case of first impression in Colorado, for the question has arisen in
over half of the states and many times in England.
The solution of the question of an infant's rights, where he has
fraudulently induced another to contract with him by misrepre-
senting his legal capacity, has resulted in the creation of two diverse
schools of thought. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile
cases in these opposite camps. The philosophy of one of the two
groups is typified by the frequently used quotation that "the priv-
ilege of infancy is to be used as a shield, and not as a sword. ' 4 This
is the epigram of the middle-of-the-road cases. The other group of
cases holds that an infant is not precluded from disaffirming his un-
wanted contracts even though he has fraudulently misrepresented
his age. This view is sometimes modified by the theory that, al-
though the infant's basic right of disaffirmance must be upheld, a
fraudulent misrepresentation of age will permit recourse to be tak-
en upon the fraudulent act itself.
2 102 Colo. 115, 76 P.2d 1106 (1938).
3 175 Mass. 513, 56 N.E. 574 (1900).
4 Rice v. Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55 N.E. 275 (1899). Here the authority cited is Abbot v. Parsons,
3 Burr. 1794, 97 Eng. Rep. 1103 (Ex. 1765).
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THE INFANT'S RIGHT IS INVIOLATE
Those jurisdictions holding that the infant may disaffirm his
unwanted contracts, regardless of his fraudulent conduct, represent
the majority view." Some jurisdictions that take this view permit
the complainant to sue the infant in tort.
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions balk at the use of a subterfuge
that permits an action to be grounded in tort where a contract is at
stake. Brooks v. Sawyer 6 is typical of this philosophy. Here the de-
fendant had misrepresented her age and taken the plaintiff's money
in return for an agreement to convey certain property to the plain-
tiff. The court said that the complainant could not change the in-
fant's fraudulent misrepresentation of capacity to contract into a
tort by changing the form of action. Similarly, in Slayton v. Barry
7
it was held that the plaintiff could not maintain his tort action
against the infant defendant, since his complaint would be invalid
without first showing there had been a contract into which he had
been induced by the infant's misrepresentation of age. In another
case,8 two juveniles purchased motorcycles by claiming to be of age,
and later renounced their contracts. The court refused to permit
the seller to sue the boys in tort for either their fraud or for dam-
ages to the machines while in their possession.
The plaintiff, an infant, in Alvey v. Reed,9 was granted relief
from the defendant's attempt to impose a mechanic's lien upon the
house which plaintiff had induced the defendant to build for her.
Here, the plaintiff had made no express representations as to age,
but she was of sufficient maturity so as to appear to have reached
majority. The court consoled the luckless defendant by informing
him that persons who deal with infants do so at their own risk.
The rule applied in these cases, as well as many others, is that
in order to charge the infant, the fraudulent act must be wholly
tortious; a matter arising ex contractu, though infected with fraud,
cannot be changed into a tort by a change in the form of action.10
Other reasons are often advanced for a refusal to charge an in-
fant with the liability of a fraudulently induced contract. Typical
of this line of cases is Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins." Here, the de-
fendant auto company appealed from a judgment awarding the in-
fant plaintiff return of all monies paid for a car which he purchased
after misrepresenting his-age. The appellate court affirmed, saying
that should the defendant be permitted to recover, it would be
equivalent to converting the infant's fraudulently induced capacity
5 Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975 (1924) (only means where-
by an infant may be protected from improvident contracts); Creer v. Active Automobile Exch., Inc.,
99 Conn. 266, 121 At. 888 (1923); Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148, 17 N.E. 265 (1888); Sawyer Boot &
Shoe Co. v. Braveman, 126 Me. 70, 136 Atl. 290 (1927); Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass.
54, 119 N.E. 359 (1918); Conrad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N.W. 695 (1880); Fulton Savings Bank v.
Downs, I Misc. 2d 695, 148 N.Y.S.2d 556 (App. T. 1956); Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Black, 119 N.C. 323, 25 S.E. 975 (1896); Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Ohio App. 229, 153 N.E.
153 (1925); Beam v. McBrayer, 132 S.C. 72, 128 S.E. 34 (1925); Nash v. Jewett, 61 Vt. 501, 18 Atl.
47 (1889).
0 191 Mass. 151, 76 N.E. 953 (1906).
7 175 Mass. 513, 56 N.E. 574 (1900).
8 Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N.E. 359 (1918).
9 115 Ind. 148, 17 N.E. 265 (1888).
10 Collins v. Gifford, 203 N.Y. 465, 96 N.E. 721 (1911); Falk v. Mac Masters, 197 App. Div. 357,
188 N.Y. Supp. 795 (1921); Nash v. Jewett, 61 Vt. 501, 18 Alt. 47 (1889).
1120 Ohio App. 229, 153 N.E. 153 (1925).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
to contract into actual capacity. It was said that the misrepresenta-
tion must be a substantive and distinct wrong in itself without refer-
ence to the contract, or there may be no recovery against an infant.
The court, in International Text Book Co. v. Connelly,12 thought
that to permit recovery of damages in contract would deprive in-
fants of the protection extended to them at an age where it is pre-
sumed that their minds and judgment are immature. They said that
infants must be shielded from their own imprudence and folly.
Similarly, the court in Tobin v. Spann 3 concluded that one under
the disability of minority has no power to remove the disability by
means of a representation, and consequently his representations
cannot be of greater weight than the contract itself.
In Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer,14 the plaintiff at-
tempted to recover, as damages in" a tort action, the equivalent of
the unpaid balance of the infant defendant's note given for the pur-
chase of a truck which he had bought upon misrepresenting his
age. The court refused recovery for fraud and deceit in the making
of the contract. The court recognized that there is a difficulty en-
countered in the practical application of the general rule permitting
infancy as a defense in an action for false representation as to any-
thing which is essentially the subject matter of the contract. It was
admitted that there is discord between courts as to when the alleged
tort in such cases is independent of or is essentially connected with
the contract, or when the contract is the essential basis of the ac-
tion. However, the court found that since the tort action was merely
an attempt to enforce the contract, recovery should be denied.
Some courts, while generally adhering to the basic principle
that the fraudulent misrepresentation must be ex delicto to be ac-
tionable, have widened the breach in this basic principle so that
equity may be granted. Where the defendant had misrepresented
her age in order to obtain credit for the purchase of a diamond
scarf pin, the court granted relief to the plaintiff who had brought
suit for damages resulting from the fraudulent conversion of the
pin. The court considered that the act of conversion per se Was out-
side the protection of the infant's right to disallow her contract.15
Along similar lines, the court in Wyatt v. Lortscher1 6 permitted the
infant to plead infancy in an action to foreclose a mortgage ob-
tained by concealment of his age. However, in dictum, it was said
that such misrepresentation might well give rise to a liability for
deceit and fraud. Another court in the same jurisdiction as Wyatt
permitted the infant to interpose his defense of infancy, but held
the misrepresentation could be made the basis of an action for de-
ceit without giving validity to the contract itself. 7
The court refused to estop an infant in Creer v. Active Automo-
bile Exch., Inc.,8 but said that the injured party might sue in tort
12 206 N.Y. 188, 99 N.E. 722 (1912) (no. misrepresentation).
13 85 Ark. 556, 109 S.W. 534 (1908).
14 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923).
15 Bergman v. Neidhardt, 37 Misc. 804, 76 N.Y. Supp. 900 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
16 217 App. Div. 224, 216 N.Y. Supp. 571 (1926).
17 New York Bldg., Loan & Banking Co. v. Fisher, 23 App. Div. 363, 48 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1897).
followed in Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1955); cf. Hecker-Jones-
Jewell Milling Co. v. Bernstein, 142 Misc. 501, 254 N.Y. Supp. 588 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (misrepresentation
not implied from mere fact that defendant purchased merchandise).
18 99 Conn. 266, 121 Ati. 888 (1923).
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instead. The court noted that should the infant be sued in contract,
he might be liable for breach; whereas, if sued in tort, the infant
would be liable only for the actual damages.
A much stronger case than Creer is found in Rice v. Boyer.",
Here, the defendant sold property which he had received on credit
by misrepresenting his age. The court, in granting recovery to the
complainant, felt that the infant was fully liable in tort to the ex-
tent of the loss actually sustained by the injured party. The logic
for such a holding was that the recovery was not an indirect en-
forcement of the infant's contract, but was rather in the nature of
compensation to the plaintiff for the actual loss caused by the de-
fendant's fraud. The court proposed that the true test should be
whether the infant could be held liable without thereby directly or
indirectly enforcing the infant's promise. The rule was approved
by the court since it would prevent unscrupulous individuals from
taking advantage of an infant's immaturity, while still charging the
infant with responsibility of making good any losses incurred by
innocent parties.
Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., Inc."° is the leading case dealing
with the question of the rights of an infant upon disaffirming an
unwanted contract which he had induced by misrepresenting his
age. The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was that such an in-
fant may not be deprived of his right of repudiation by any doctrine
of estoppel. The court, however, ruled that the ancient doctrine of
equity applied, in that one seeking equity, must first do equity.
Though the infant was permitted to disaffirm, the party injured by
the infant's fraudulent misrepresentation was entitled to limited
damages for the amount of repairs necessary to recondition the
automobile returned by the infant.
21
A SHIELD BUT NOT A SWORD
Contrary to the majority view, some jurisdictions rely upon
application of an equitable estoppel where an infant has fraudulent-
ly misrepresented his age in order to induce another to contract
with him. A close study of the decisions following this doctrine will
reveal that the courts in these jurisdictions are striving to prevent
the "shield of infancy" from being used "as a sword." Full recogni-
tion is given to the basic tenet of the contractual immunity of in-
fants; but, by the application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais, the
injustice so often found in cases where the rights of infants are
blindly upheld is sought to be eliminated. Estoppel in pais may
well be considered a special application of the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel." Estoppel in pais is aptly defined as the doctrine
"that a person may be precluded by his act or conduct or silence,
when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he other-
wise would have had.
23
The opinion has been expressed that a fraudulent misrepre-
19 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 420 (1886).
20 273 U.S. 18 (1927).
21 Accord: Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U.S. 300 (1880); Dick Murphy, Inc. v. Holcer, 57 F.2d 431 (D.C.
Cir. 1932).
22 See Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932) for definition of promissory estoppel.
23 Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Ore. 506, 154 P.2d 547, 551 (1944).
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sentation as to age, by. an infant seeking to induce another to con-
tract with him, should not be considered as either part of the con-
tract or as growing out of the contract. In such a case, no contract
is made as to the infant's age, and the sale is not a consideration for
the representation of capacity. However, to hold the infant estopped
by his act, it should be found that there was an actual and positive
fraud, committed by some unequivocal act, and not merely inferred
by the silence or acquiescence of an infant having full knowledge
of his rights.24
This doctrine has been widely followed in the South. Kentucky
is perhaps the leader in this theory of estoppel; for the largest num-
ber of decisions where the theory has been applied have come from
that state. Other jurisdictions adhering to the doctrine of estoppel
include Texas, Georgia, Virginia, Mississippi, Florida, Tennessee,
Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, and New Jersey.2"
One of the earliest reported decisions applying the doctrine of
estoppel was Ryan v. Growney,26 where it was recognized that such
a doctrine, though not applicable in a court of law, was permissible
in a court of equity. Following this decision, other states began ap-
plying the doctrine of estoppel in pais. Where there has been an
outright positive fraud on the part of the infant, it is not difficult
to agree with the theory of estoppel. For example, it has been held
that such fraudulent misrepresentation of age as positively swear-
ing to be of age, 27 falsifying records in a family bible,28 exhibiting a
driver's license with a false age thereon, 29 and procuring a falsified
affidavit from one's parents 30 will prevent an infant from reaching
protection behind the shield of infancy.
The problem is compounded where the infant has not made a
direct and positive misrepresentation that he is of legal capacity to
contract. The rule followed.in such cases is that estoppel will apply
only where the conditions, appearances, and surroundings of the
infant were such that one dealing with him would be deceived as to
his true age. This effectively protects infants of such tender years
that no one could honestly be deceived by their misrepresentations
of majority2 1 Under this rule penalizing concealment of true age,
it has been held that an infant is estopped from voiding his contract
when the question of the infant's age was never raised at the time
of negotiation, although he had ample opportunity to divulge his
true age.
2 2
Infants with a mature appearance, which is reinforced by the
general reputation of supporting a family of their own, have often
been estopped from taking refuge behind the shield of infancy.
Estoppel was ruled where at the time of sale such an infant denied
that there was any encumbrance or bar to his right to sell his prop-
24 Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 17 S.W.2d 8 (1929).
22 Coses subsequently cited are from these jurisdictions.
26 125 Mo. 474, 28 S.W. 189 (1894).
27 Johnson v. McAdory, 228 Miss. 453, 88 So. 2d 106 (1956); Commander v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668,
41 So. 497 (1906); Ostrander v. Quin, 84 Miss. 230, 36 So. 257 (1904); Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb.
342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921); Evans v. Henry, 230 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
28 Turner v. Stewart, 149 Ky. 15, 147 S.W. 772 (1912).
29 Mossier Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1950).
30 Edgar v. Gertison, 112 S.W. 831 (Ky. 1908).
31 New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 S.W. 245 (1920).
32 First State Bank v. Edwards, 245 S.W. 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
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erty.3 Even though such an infant of apparent majority had made
no express representation as to his age, the court held that he was
estopped from rescinding his unwanted contract.34
Looney v. Elkhorn Land Co.35 involved a situation where a mar-
ried woman, prohibited from contracting by virtue of her marital
status, misrepresented her age and concealed her disability of cover-
ture. In an action to void her sale, the court held that even though
the contract was void ab initio because of her disability by cover-
ture, the general rule that a void contract could not work an estop-
pel did not apply where a fraudulent misrepresentation was made.
In Harseim v. Cohen36 the infant defendant had a business in
her name; but, in actuality, her father managed it. A salesman had
negotiated a contract with the father in the mistaken belief that the
father was the true owner. The father, using his daughter's name,
ordered some merchandise and then failed to pay for these goods.
The court held the infant liable for the contract made in her name
because she had known of and consented to the fraudulent scheme
of her father. This case was distinguished in Memphis Coffin Co. v.
Patton,3 7 where, under similar circumstances, the infant's father
conducted a business under the infant's name. Here, however, the
court refused to hold the infant liable for a note signed in the in-
fant's name by the father when it was shown that the infant had
no knowledge of his father's wrongful act.
An unusual case is found in Asher v. Bennett,38 where the mis-
representation of an infant was used to the disadvnatage of an in-
nocent party. In this case, the infant conveyed some land to the
defendant after fraudulently misrepresenting his age. After reach-
ing majority, the infant conveyed the same land to a third party,
who subsequently conveyed the property to the plaintiff. In an ac-
tion to quiet title, the plaintiff was held to be without a valid title.
The court held that the original conveyance to the defendant was
valid, notwithstanding the later rescission by the infant.
ESTOPPEL WITH A BENEFIT
The rule that estoppel will preclude an infant from disaffirm-
ing his unwanted contracts is applied in New Jersey, Wisconsin, and
Georgia. In these states, however, an added requirement is that
such an estoppel will apply only when the infant has in some way
retained a benefit from the fraudulently induced contract. Because
of this added requirement, cases in these jurisdictions naturally
turn upon the question of whether the infant has received and re-
tained some benefit from the contract.
The doctrine that estoppel will be applied where the infant re-
tains a benefit from the contract was first intimated in Pemberton
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Adams.39 Here, in an action to collect on a
33 Gaff v. Murphy, 153 Ky. 634, 156 S.W. 95 (1913); County Board of Education v. Hensley, 147
Ky. 441, 144 S.W. 63 (1912).
34 Young v. Daniel, 201 Ky. 65, 255 S.W. 854 (1923); Smith v. Cole, 148 Ky. 138, 146 S.W. 30
(1912). Contra, Stallard v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, 108 S.E. 568 (1921) (infant estopped by express
misrepresentation, but dictum said that. concealment alone would not be sufficient to establish an
estoppel).
35 195 Ky. 198, 242 S.W. 27 (1922).
36 25 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
37 106 S.W. 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
38 143 Ky. 361, 136 S.W. 879 (1911).
39 53 N.J. Eq. 258, 31 Ati. 280 (Ch. 1895).
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loan contract, it was held that a court of equity would not permit
an infant to avoid the enforcement of a contract procured by his
fraudulent misrepresentation of age without return of the money
to the lender.
In what is perhaps the most widely quoted case propounding
the doctrine that estoppel will be applied where the infant retains a
benefit, the infant misrepresented his age to induce the defendant
to permit him to store his automobile in the defendant's garage. The
defendant was also asked periodically to furnish supplies for the
car and to repair it. In an action to replevy his automobile, which
the defendant had seized upon non-payment of charges, the court
refused to allow the defendant's counter-claim since it was public
policy not to require enforcement of infant's contracts.4 0 The de-
fendant appealed; the appellate court reversed the decision and
found for the defendant, saying that an infant under such circum-
stances is estopped when he obtains and retains a benefit from a
contract induced by fraudulent misrepresentations as to his age.41
This case now represents the prevailing rule, in other states as well
as New Jersey.
Following La Rosa v. Nichols, it has been held that an infant
is estopped when he fails to pay a charge account, 2 is unable to re-
turn the chattel contracted for,43 or returns the property after using
it for six months.44 However, in Feinsilver v. Schifter Motors, Inc.,45
the infant plaintiff was permitted to recover his payments, less de-
preciation, for a car which he returned after misrepresenting his
age. Relief was granted when it was shown that he had offered to
return the car and asked that the defendant refund his payments
minus a fair amount for depreciation. This case would seem to fol-
low the rule that "he that seeks equity, must first do equity."
It is necessary that the infant himself obtain the benefit before
the estoppel will apply. The defendant in Public Finance Service,
Inc. v. Amato46 misrepresented her age in applying for a loan for
the use of her brother who had been previously denied a loan by
the plaintiff. Upon obtaining the loan, the defendant gave the
money to her brother and did not receive any of its benefits. The
court permitted her to rescind her contract, and held that estoppel
did not apply since she had not received or retained any of the
benefits of the fraudulently induced contract. Similarly, in an ac-
tion on default of a note upon which the infant defendant was an
accomodation maker, the court refused to estop him. In this case,
the defendant had become a guarantor for the wife of a friend. The
friend's wife failed to pay, and to obtain the forebearance of the
plaintiff from suing the wife, the defendant signed a new note as an
accomodation maker. The court felt that the infant defendant had
not received any benefit from the agreement of the plaintiff.47
40 LO Rosa v. Nichols, 91 N.J.L. 355, 103 At. 390 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
41 La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 At. 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918).
42 Clemons v. Olshine, 54 Ga. App. 290, 187 S.E. 711 (1936); R. J. Goerke Co. v. Nicolson, 5
N.J. Super. 412, 69 A.2d 326 (Super. Ct. 1949).
43 Wotters v. Arrington, 39 Ga. App. 275, 146 S.E. 773 (1929).
44 Brinkmann v. Dorsey Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.L. 115, 1 A.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
45 127 N.J.L. 459, 23 A.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
46 22 N.J. Misc. 331, 38 A.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. 1944).
47 Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50 (1910) (estoppel permitted
only where an infant of actual discretion fraudulently receives a benefit from contract).
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Another imprudent infant was protected by the court in Me-
chanics Finance Co. v. Paolino .4 Here, the defendant had signed a
note to the plaintiff to secure a debt owed by a girl whom he had
known for only a few weeks. The defendant expressly misrepre-
sented his age in signing the note in return for the plaintiff's prom-
ise not to sue the girl. Here, too, the court felt that although the
infant's conduct was reprehensible, he had not received any true
benefit from the contract, and therefore, should not be held respon-
sible for the note.
Another improvident infant was spared responsibility for his
contract where he had returned the stock certificates purchased un-
der a contract which he did not take time to read before signing.
The contract contained a clause by which the signer affirmed that
he was of age. The court held that to estop the infant would en-
force a contract which the law permits a minor to avoid. The court
also thought that the law does not impose a duty upon an infant to
read a contract, and does not attach to his failure to do so the con-
sequences that are attached to the failure of an adult to so read.
When it was shown that the infant had returned the stock certifi-
cates to the seller without loss to either party, the court held that
the infant was not liable for his contract. 9
The general rule in these three jurisdictions, therefore, is that
an infant is estopped from exercising his privilege of avoidance
where the benefit is in some way retained, and where it appears
that the other party, dealing in good faith, was induced to act by
reason of the fraudulent misrepresentation of the infant as to his
age. The other party must be justified in accepting such misrepre-
sentation as true. He must also be free from fault or negligence on
his own part, such as a failure to use all ready means of ascertain-
ing the truth touching upon the infant's apparent majority.50 How-
ever, it is not necessary that the creditor make an independent in-
vestigation of the truthfulness of the infant's representations, unless
the youthful appearance of the infant purchaser or other facts or
circumstances appear, such as would reasonably tend to cast doubt
or suspicion on the truthfulness of the representation. 1
It is not necessary that the misrepresentation be made concur-
rently with the obtaining of the benefit or goods contracted for. In
Horwitz v. Hudson County Nat'l Bank,52 the plaintiff falsified her
age some two years before obtaining a personal loan from the bank.
The court held that she was estopped when she sought to recover
her deposits, which the bank had refused, to turn over until her loan
was paid.
The benefit can be rather remote and still be such that the
court will estop an infant from avoidance. Thus, the court in Sawic-
48 29 N.J. Super. 449, 102 A.2d 784 (Super. Ct. 1954).
49 Woodoll v. Grant & Co., 62 Ga. App. 581, 9 S.E.2d 95 (1940); cf. Sternlieb v. Normandie
Nat'l Securities Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934) where the court refused to estop an infant
seeking return of monies paid for stock which subsequently become valueless following the 1929
stock market crash. The court refused to permit the defendant to plead as an affirmative defense
that the infant plaintiff had fraudulently misrepresented his age in inducing the stock purchase
contract.
50 Carney v. Southland loan Co., Inc., 92 Go. App. 559, 88 S.E.2d 805 (1955); Hood v. Duren, 33
Ga. App. 203, 125 S.E. 787 (1924).
51 Clemons v. Olshine, 54 Ga. App. 290, 187 S.E. 711 (1936).
52 125 N.J.L. 3, 13 A.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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ki v. Slahor53 held the defendant liable for breach of promise when
he misrepresented his age to the infant plaintiff. Shortly following
the defendant's promise to marry her, the plaintiff submitted to his
embraces and later found that she was pregnant. The court felt that
the defendant had obtained a benefit sufficient to prevent him from
pleading infancy as a defense.
Sonntag v. Heller54 involved a situation where the infant plain-
tiff sued the defendant to collect upon the first of three plumbing
contracts between the two parties. The defendant counter-claimed
for damages on the non-performance of the other contracts. The
court refused to estop the plaintiff in his reply and permitted him
to disallow the unperformed contracts on the ground of infancy.
Here, the court felt that the plaintiff had not received any benefit
from the last two contracts.
THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES
Several points must be determined before damages can be com-
puted. The most important consideration is that of the values to be
assigned to the property obtained by the infant, and, when neces-
sary, to the property which he traded to the injured party. The
next point is what recognition, if any, should be given to the de-
preciation of the purchased chattel returned by the infant. It is dif-
ficult to find a line of authority answering these questions. Few
cases are found concerning these questions where the infant had in-
duced the contract by fraudulent misrepresentation of his age. In
the few cases that are found, it is difficult to find a set pattern to
govern the computation of damages. The cases appear to be in
hopeless conflict.
Many cases may be found that involve the question of damages
where an infant repudiated his contract; but without the element
of fraudulent misrepresentation, it seems logical that little weight
should be given to them. Without such misrepresentation, the courts
should strive to return the infant to the same position he occupied
before the contract was made. However, where there is such a mis-
representation, it would seem that equity should be done to both
parties without regard to the general rule requiring that the infant
be restored to his initial status.
Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., Inc.5 is the leading case concern-
ing both the rights of the infant, where he had fraudulently mis-
represented his age, and the damages to which the injured party is
entitled. The court in that case allowed disaffirmance by the in-
fant despite his misrepresentation, and awarded him damages in the
amount of the sums already paid under the contract. The defendant
had counter-claimed for an amount in excess of the plaintiff's
claims. This amount was the sum required to restore the returned
automobile to the same condition as when the plaintiff had received
it. The court allowed the defendant to recover only that amount
equal to the amount claimed by, and awarded to, the plaintiff, de-
spite the fact that the defendant had proved his damages to be
53 11 N.J. Misc. 604, 167 Ati. 691 (Cir. Ct. 1933).
5497 N.J.L. 462, 117 Atl. 638 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922).
55 273 U.S. 18 (1927).
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larger. It should be pointed out, however, that the court's decision
to limit the defendant's damages to an amount equal to the plain-
tiff's claim was colored by the doctrine of recoupment.
Under the doctrine of recoupment, it was necessary that the
counter-claim arise out of the same transaction which formed the
basis for the plaintiff's cause of action. Also, recoupment was a
purely defensive measure and, at most, could only cancel the plain-
tiff's claim. 6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have removed
this limitation of recoupment.57 It is problematical as to what dam-
ages would have been awarded in Myers had the present-day rules
been in use. Despite the modern license to include all damages that
the defendant has incurred, the recoupment limitation has become
entrenched in many jurisdictions. 8
What value should be assigned to the items in question? Should
the agreed-upon contract prices be used, or should some other yard-
stick be applied? Here again, few cases are found in which the
question has arisen in a suit involving a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. The Colorado Supreme Court in Doenges-Long approved the
rule laid down in Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc.59 which, although
there was no question of fraud, held that the infant was entitled to
only the fair market value at the time of the transaction. This was
thought to be fair, as neither side is bound by any part of the con-
tract once it is rescinded. Other authorities are cited in Doenges-
Long as approving the use of the contract price; 61 but, our court
wisely disapproved this valuation since it would tend to give limited
effect to the now-voided contract. Neither of these cases involved
a question of fraud.
Depreciation has been awarded in several cases where fraudu-
lent misrepresentation was an issue. Obviously, however, these
awards are found only in those jurisdictions approving either the
estoppel in pais doctrine or the tort responsibility exception rule.
The court in Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co., Inc.,62 though not ap-
proving of estoppel, thought it equitable for the injured party to
recoup damages for depreciation. In Sparandera v. Staten Island
Garage, Inc.,64 even though the infant had misrepresented his age,
the defendant did not make any allegation as to the fraud. How-
ever, the court dismissed the infant's complaint when it was shown
that the seller's loss from depreciation of the car had exceeded the
amount prayed for by the plaintiff.
With the apparent conflict between jurisdictions as to the en-
tire problem of what to do when an infant procures a contract by
the fraudulent misrepresentation of his age, it is thought that the
66 State v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg. Co., 98 Ark. 125, 135 S.W. 843 (1911).
57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
58 Berryman v. Highway Trailer Co., 307 Ill. App. 480, 30 N.E.2d 761 (1940); Mestetzko v. Elf
Motar Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 165 N.E. 93 (1929); Rush v. Grevey, 90 Ohio App. 536, 107 N.E.2d 560
(1951); Smith v. Newark Shoe Co., 42 Ohio App. 437, 182 N.E. 347 (1932).
59 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929).
60 See Carpenter v. Grow, 247 Mass. 133, 141 N.E. 859 (1923) (no fraud; infant entitled to value
of his car as of time of making contract).
61 Lockhart v. National Cash Register Co., 66 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (trade-in value
approved); Schoenung v. Gallett, 206 Wis. 52, 238 N.W. 852 (1931).
62 186 Minn. 558, 244 N.W. 412 (1932).
63 See also Scalone v. Talley Motors, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 674, 158 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1957).
64 117 Misc. 780, 193 N.Y. Supp. 392 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1921).
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Colorado Supreme Court handled the situation in a very logical and
straight-forward manner. Perhaps- Doenges-Long will become a
landmark case and set the pace for courts to follow in the future.
Colorado would do well to adopt a statute such as that found
in Iowa. 5 Such a statute, prohibiting the disaffirmance of infant's
contracts where it is shown that the infant induced the contract by
his fraudulent misrepresentation of age, would go far in eliminat-
ing the problems created for innocent business men in such in-
stances. Any such statute, it is felt, should be so worded as to re-
quire (1) a positive showing that the infant actively sought the
contract, (2) that there was an express misrepresentation of age by
the infant, (3) that the contract was one through which the infant
derived and retained a finite benefit for himself, and (4) that both
parties be restored as nearly as possible to their original status.
Damages awarded to the injured party should be limited to those
that result directly and proximately from the infant's misrepre-
sentation. Depreciation and devaluation of the chattel in question
would be considered. The statute should also require that damages
be computed from the reasonable value of the property in question
at the time of making the contract.
65 Iowa Code Ann. § 599.3 (Supp. 1954). "No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases, where,
on account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in
business as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe him capable of contracting." See
Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 73 N.W.2d 1 (1955) for a case much like Doenges-Long
where the statute was applied. See also Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-103 (1949); Utah Code Ann. §
15-2-3 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.28.040 (Supp. 1953).
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Automobiles - Guest Statutes -
Change of Guest Status
By HARMON S. GRAVES III
William Andrews was drinking in a bar and looking for com-
pany for a trip. Nell Kirk, who had gone out with him a few times
before, accepted his invitation when her girl friend, Ann Coppinger,
agreed to go along with them. They had driven only a short dis-
tance when Andrews began swerving the car while laughing and
talking to the girls. Both girls protested, and as an answer Andrews
increased his speed. Nell requested repeatedly to be let out of the
car, right up to the time Andrews entered a curve at eighty-five
miles per hour causing the car to leave the road and overturn sev-
eral times. All three occupants were injured. The court held that
when one accepts an invitation to become a passenger in an auto-
mobile, without prior knowledge that the driver is likely to drive
dangerously, and the passenger is put in fear of serious harm from
such conduct, a protest against negligent driving, coupled with a
demand to be let out of the car, will change the status of the guest
to that of involuntary passenger if the demand is refused. Andrews
v. Kirk, 106 So. 2nd 110 (Fla. 1958).
The question of change of status met squarely in this case im-
mediately raises the more inclusive question of whether, by allow-
ing a change of status and thus permitting a rider to recover for
injuries caused by simple negligence, the protection intended by the
guest statutes for the automobile host is abrogated.
In the absence of statute, the majority view under the common
law requires the driver to exercise reasonable care toward his in-
vited guest in the operation of the vehicle.' But the application of
the law of real property normally gives the gratuitous guest the
status of a licensee.2 This means that the operator is not required
to make the vehicle safe for the guest, but that the operator owes
the guest the duty merely of not increasing the existing hazards of
travel nor creating new peril.3
The reasoning appears to be that permission to ride in the auto-
mobile of another is essentially the same as permission to enter and
use another's premises. Under such conditions, the operator owes
the guest a duty to exercise reasonable care, or, expressed in terms
of negligence, he is liable to his guest for ordinary negligence.
4
It is primarily against this background that the legislatures in
numerous states have enacted statutory changes in the common law
rule of ordinary negligence. Much the same result achieved through
the "guest statutes" was effected in the minority states under the
common law by holding the operator liable to the gratuitous guest
only for gross negligence.'
1 Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1016 (1922).
2 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Low and Practice, § 2295, pt. 1 (perm. ed. 1946).
3 Perkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875 (1915).
4 Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518 (1922).
5 E.g., Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 255, 195 S.E. 226 (1938).
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Perhaps the most emphatic language justifying the adoption of
"guest statutes" is that of a Colorado case, Dobbs v. Sugioka: 
6
"Clearly they were enacted to prevent recovery by those
who had no moral right to recompense, those carried for
their own convenience, for their own business or pleasure,
those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture,
'hitchhikers' and 'bums' who sought to make profit out of
softhearted and unfortunate motorists."
Stated in more general terms, the guest statutes were de-
signed to relieve the severity of the common law rule which re-
quires the driver, under the majority view, to exercise ordinary
care even to a recipient of his kindness and hospitality.
7
Guest statutes of the several states have restricted the com-
mon law liability in varying degrees. An extreme example is a
requirement in the Washington statute8 expressed in Atkins v.
Hemphill9 There, a sixteen-year-old girl accepted an invitation to
ride with the defendant, but upon discovering he had been drinking
and was driving in a negligent manner, she demanded to be let out
of the car. Her request, although repeated frequently, was refused.
While attempting to pass one truck, the defendant collided with
6 117 Colo. 210, 185 P.2d 784 (1947).
7 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 2292, pt.1, at 305 (perm. ed. 1946).
For a discussion of the pros and cons of guest statutes see Kripke, Should Colorado Retain the "Guest
Sfatute"?-Public Policy v. Insurance Policy, 35 DICTA 179 (1958) and Wormwood, In Defense of the
Colorado Guest Statute, 35 DICTA 174 (1958).
8 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6360-121 (1937).
5 33 Wash. 2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
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another. The court held that the girl's demands did not terminate
her status as a guest within the requirements of the local guest
statute, which disallowed recovery for all but "intentional" acci-
dents.
This case should be viewed in light of the question: "Who is a
guest for the purposes of the automobile guest statutes?" General-
ly, a "guest" may be defined as one who voluntarily accepts the
hospitality of another, and the term normally excludes one who has
such hospitality forced upon him.10 For example, a kidnapped or
abducted person who is driven in a car is an involuntary rider and
is outside the statute." It would appear, then, that one who is not
voluntarily in the car would not be a guest and subject to the guest
statute. Unfortunately, Washington has taken the view that once
the guest status has been created it continues for the duration of
the trip.
12
There is general agreement that a guest's simple protest to
negligent driving, unaccompanied by a demand to be let out, is
insufficient to terminate the guest status.13
Change of status of a guest was allowed in the Georgia case of
Blanchard v. Ogletree."4 The holding of this case was adopted by
the Florida court in the instant case, but it must be noted that Geor-
gia does not have a guest statute and it is a minority state under the
common law, limiting the driver's liability to gross negligence.
1 5
In Blanchard the court held that one who rode gratuitously in an-
other's automobile became engaged in a joint enterprise and as-
sumed the risk of the driver's ordinary negligence. But, when the
passenger requested to leave the car, she withdrew from the joint
enterprise and no longer assumed the risk. Thus, the driver was
liable for ordinary negligence when he refused the rider's request.
The views of the Florida and Georgia courts appear to reflect
the underlying purpose of the guest statutes without generally
subjecting the automobile host to the consequences of ordinary
negligence. Florida permits a change of status under its guest stat-
ute16 which is similar to those enacted in most states; i.e., it requires
a showing of at least gross negligence, and Georgia takes a similar
stand under the minority common law view.
Some courts have reached the same result without squarely
facing the question. This they have done by making the refusal of
the host to allow the guest to depart, one of the elements leading
to a finding of gross negligence. 17 Nothing seems to indicate that a
person who is invited as a gratuitous guest must remain one. The
basis of the host-guest relationship is one of mutual consent and a
withdrawal of consent by the guest ought to end the guest status.
10 Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950).
11 Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1958) (dictum).
12 Taylor v. Toug, 17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
13 Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1952).
1441 Go. App. 2, 152 S.E. 116 (1930).
15 Ibid.
16 Fla. Ann. Stat. § 320.59 (1953).
17 E.g., Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn. 69, 147 AtI. 568 (1929).
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Automobiles-Vehicles At Rest Or Unattended-Non-Liability Of
Owner To Third Person Injured By Automobile Driven By
Escaping Thief
By JOHN L. RICH
In violation of a city ordinance, the defendant left the keys in
the ignition switch of her unlocked, parked automobile. The auto-
mobile was stolen, and sometime later, while being pursued by po-
lice, the thief lost control of the automobile, damaging the plaintiff's
grape arbor. The parties agreed that the collision and damage did
not occur in the act of theft or in immediate pursuit thereafter.
Held: Plaintiff's declaration dismissed. The ordinance imposes upon
an owner no duty making him liable to a third person whom a
thief might negligently injure. Therefore, the plaintiff was not
within the class of persons whom the ordinance was designed to
protect. Corinti v. Wittkopp, 93 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1959).
Under the common law rule where there is no statute or or-
dinance involved it is generally held that an automobile owner is
not liable for the negligence of a thief where the owner has left his
keys in the ignition switch.1 However, some courts have indicated
that even though a statute or ordinance is not involved, the owner
might be held liable if the circumstances were such that the theft
and the subsequent negligence of the thief were reasonably foresee-
able by the owner.2 These courts have placed an owner of an auto-
mobile under a duty to exercise such care as a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in leaving an automobile upon a public
street.
The reasoning of the courts has been complicated by statutes or
ordinances which prohibit an automobile driver from leaving his
automobile unattended with the keys in the ignition.3 The majority
of cases involving such statutes or ordinances have held the owner
1 Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., 253 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1950); Holder v. Poperaden, 146 Cal.
App. 2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956); Wagner v. Arthur, 134 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio C.P. 1956). But see Schaff
v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
2 Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100
S.E.2d 511 (1957); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1951).
3 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-76 (1953); Denver, Colo., Rev. Munic. Code § 518.7 (1950).
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not liable to third persons for the negligent acts of a thief.4 How-
ever, a respectable minority of co,.rts have held the owner liable
because of the statute or ordinance involved. The principal case
represents the majority view on this problem."
While the majority view has held the owner not liable, the
courts have reached this result by various lines of reasoning.7 The
general theme seems to be that the owner's original act of leaving
the keys in the ignition switch is not the proximate cause of the
third person's injuries." The proximate cause is the negligent driv-
ing of the thief.9 This negligence of the thief has been called an in-
tervening efficient cause 0 or an intervening independent act 1
which interrupts the chain of causation between the owner's act
and the third person's injuries.
It has become necessary for the courts to determine the intent
of the legislative body in enacting the ordinance or statute. The
second line of reasoning arriving at the majority result is that such
an ordinance or statute is enacted for the protection of the automo-
bile owner and as an aid to proper law enforcement rather than to
prevent negligent driving from the scene of a car theft.1 2 The min-
ority view has interpreted such ordinances or statutes as safety
measures intended to prevent injuries to the public.13
Occasionally the ordinance or statute itself will contain an ex-
clusionary sentence stating that it shall have no bearing in any
civil action. 14 Since the obvious intent of an ordinance or statute
containing this proviso is that a violation should not affect civil lia-
bility, the third person is not one of the class of persons for whose
benefit it was enacted and, hence, cannot recover from the owner
for the negligent act of the thief. 5
The minority view considers an ordinance or statute prohibit-
ing an owner from leaving the keys in the ignition switch of his
automobile not an anti-theft measure for the benefit of the owner,
but rather as a measure designed to promote the public safety.
16 It
is notable that in every case upholding the minority rule, the injury
or damage to the third person occurred during the act of theft or
during immediate pursuit. The courts seem to emphasize this fact
by saying that an owner should foresee that a thief who steals his
automobile will be negligent when fleeing from the scene of the
4 Frank v. Ralston, 248 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1957); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23
(1954); Kiste v. Red Cob, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 108 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Galbraith v. Levin, 323
Mass. 225, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927); An-
derson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Gower v. Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App.
1955).
5 Ross v. iHortman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944); Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 III. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537
(1948); Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 129 N.E.2d 537 (C.P. 1955).
6 Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 633 (1957).
7 Note, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 740.
8 See generally Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 225, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1958); Anderson v. Theisen,
231 Min. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
9 Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369,
43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
10 Anderson v. Theisen, supra note 9 (alternative holding).
11 Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927).
12 Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) (alternative holding).
13 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944); Ney v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 2 III. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
14 For cases construing such ordinances or statutes, see Richards v. Stanley, 43 Col. 2d 60, 271
P.2d 23 (1954); Gower v. Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
15 Gower v. Lamb, supro note 14.
16 Cases cited note 5 supra.
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theft.1 7 However, the fallacy of this is that an owner would have
no reason to foresee that a thief might be negligent, since a thief,
in order not to attract attention, may be very careful when leaving
the scene of the theft. 8 A recent case, which held an owner not
liable, has repudiated any distinction between an injury occurring
while the thief is fleeing and one occurring after the theft has been
completed. 19 If no distinction is made, the minority rule would ap-
parently hold an owner liable even though a thief injured a third
person weeks or months after the theft. While the minority posi-
tion has been rationalized on the grounds of public policy,20 such an
extreme position "goes far towards making the defendant an insurer
as to the consequences of every accident in which his automobile
might become involved while operated by the original thief or his
successors in possession."
2 1
The court in the instant case reasoned that the ordinance did
not impose a duty upon the driver to remove his keys from the igni-
tion switch for the benefit of third persons whom a theif might
negligently injure. Therefore, the liability sought to be imposed
was beyond the scope of duty required by the ordinance. The same
result of non-liability would have been reached whether the court
reasoned that the conduct of the thief was an intervening cause
breaking the chain of causation between the defendant's act of leav-
ing her keys in the ignition switch and the subsequent injury to
the plaintiff or, as the court did reason, that the plaintiff was not
within the class of persons whom the ordinance was designed to
protect.
Obviously the court reached the right decision by following the
majority rule. However, since it was agreed by the parties that the
damage did not occur during the actual perpetration of the theft or
in immediate pursuit thereafter, it is still possible that the Michigan
court may make a distinction in a proper case and hold an automo-
bile owner liable to a third person where a thief negligently injures
such third person during or just after a car theft. Thus, the instant
court may find that an owner owes a duty to a plaintiff who is in-
jured by a thief driving away from the place of his theft. It would
have been better had the court reasoned that the negligent driving
of the thief was the legal cause22 of the plaintiff's damage. It would
be more difficult for the court to make any future distinction based
on time of injury if the reasoning had been in terms of legal cause
rather than on the ground that the defendant owed no duty to this
particular plaintiff. Then all doubt would have been removed as to
whether or not an automobile owner will be liable in the future to
third persons injured by a thief fleeing the scene of his theft.
17 See, e.g., Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 III. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948)
18 Holder v. Poperaden, 146 Cal. App. 2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956);- Soocco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J.
Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1951).
19 Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
20 Comment, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 376 (1949).
21 Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 362, 54 A.2d 520, 525 (1947).
22 For a definition of "legal cause," see Restatement, Torts § 9 (1934).
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Constitutional Law - Commerce and Due Process Clauses - State
Regulation of Interstate Commerce - State Taxing Power
By ANNE DOUTHIT
The state income tax laws of both Minnesota and Georgia levy
taxes on the net income of foreign corporations whose business
within the taxing state consists exclusively of interstate commerce.
The taxes are imposed only on that portion of net income which is
earned from and fairly apportioned to activities within the taxing
state. The statutes were attacked as violating the commerce and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court upheld Minnesota's tax, but Georgia's law was
declared invalid by that state's court. The United States Supreme
Court noted jurisdiction of the appeal in the Minnesota case and
granted certiorari in the Georgia case. The objecting taxpayers
were foreign corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of
products from plants located outside the taxing states. Each main-
tained a sales office within the state from which salesmen solicited
orders in the area. Orders were approved in the home offices and
shipments were sent directly to the customers. Neither merchan-
dise inventories nor property, other than office furniture, was lo-
cated within the taxing states; nor was any capital employed in the
states other than expenditures for office rent, salesmen's salaries
and incidental selling expenses. In each case, a substantial portion
of the taxpayer's total sales volume was affected.
The Court held that both of the statutes in question were valid.
The opinion declared that net income from the interstate operations
of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided
the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to activi-
ties within the taxing state. Maintaining a sales office for the
solicitation of interstate sales is sufficient activity within the state
to subject the selling organization to an obligation to share in the
cost of local government. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 79 Sup. Ct. 357 (1959).
-The conflict between the states' taxing power, and the power of
Congress to regulate commerce between and among the states has
endured a long and stormy history in the courts. The economic
growth of this country, the attendant mushrooming of commerce
across state lines, and the increasing revenue requirements of state
and local governments, have gradually made it necessary for the
courts to distinguish between those taxes which are regulatory in
nature, and those which merely prorate the costs of local govern-
ment over all local activities.
Out of the several hundred cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court have evolved a number of tests for determining the validity
and constitutionality of state taxing measures. Fundamental to the
entire line of cases is the rule that the tax cannot impose a direct
restriction on interstate commerce.1 Nor can it be discriminatory,
favoring purely local or intrastate activity.2 Therefore, a tax im-
posed upon the privilege of carrying on interstate business is not
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
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within the power of a state.' Some taxing formulas have been de-
clared unenforceable because they have attempted to subject inter-
state commerce to multiple taxation, an undue burden which would
seriously impede commerce among the states.4 The taxation of
property after it has come to rest within a state, 5 and the imposition
of sales taxes on certain interstate transactions have been upheld.
The leading case dealing with the taxation of net income from
interstate commerce is United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak
Creek.7 There the taxpayer was a domestic corporation. The case
established that a net income tax is not a direct, but an incidental,
burden on interstate commerce. It was concluded that such a tax,
as long as it is nondiscriminatory, is one of the general burdens of
government from which persons and corporations otherwise subject
to the state's jurisdiction cannot be exempted. While the language
did not limit the application of the rule to domestic corporations, it
implied that a foreign corporation, to be so taxed, must at least be
subject to the state's jurisdiction, and be entitled to the rights and
privileges accorded domestic corporations. In order for a foreign
corporation to acquire such rights, normally it must qualify to do
business in the state, and thus become domiciled.
The question of taxation of income earned within the borders
of the taxing state by a person outside that state's jurisdiction was
discussed in Shaffer v. Carter.I However, the facts in that case were
not comparable to the present fact situation because interstate ac-
tivity was not involved. In the Shaffer case, Oklahoma was at-
tempting to tax a nonresident's income which derived from oil and
gas leases and properties located in Oklahoma. The case turned on
the fact that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over the property, though
the owner was a nonresident. Although the decision stated that the
business of a nonresident should not be exempted from making a
ratable contribution in taxes for the support of the government, it
cannot be interpreted as authority for taxing income of a non-
resident derived from exclusively interstate commerce.
3 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
4 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
t Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
6 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
7 247 U.S. 231 (1918).
8 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
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A later case,9 following the United States Glue and Shaffer de-
cisions defined further the obligation of a foreign corporation to
share in the costs of local government. The test, stated this opinion,
is "whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal rela-
tions to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state."
In a word, has "the state given anything for which it can ask re-
turn?" 10 The taxing statute was upheld in this instance, but it must
be noted that the foreign corporation was locally licensed and
actually deriving benefits from the state. In effect, it had moved
into the state to carry on an intrastate operation.
The difference beween an unlicensed foreign corporation and a
licensed or qualified foreign corporation was discussed in a case
dealing with a sales tax levy." The case declared the levy unen-
forceable, though it was similar to a sales tax which had previously
been upheld.1 2 The distinction between the two cases was the fact
that in one case, the corporation maintained sales offices in the tax-
ing state, took contracts there, and made deliveries; while in the
other case all offices were maintained outside the state, sales made
out of the state, and the delivery consummated in interstate com-
merce. However, since the incidence of a sales tax falls on the
consumer, and not on the seller, such cases are not necessarily
controlling, or even guiding in the instant fact situation.
The concept established by the principal case is not actually as
revolutionary as some of the publicity accorded to it would imply.
The Supreme Court without opinion affirmed a California decision
upholding a comparable tax imposed upon income earned through
similar business activities.13 There, as in the instant case, the cor-
poration had not qualified to do business, but was merely maintain-
ing a sales office for the purpose of soliciting orders which were
accepted and filled from the home office. The salesmen did have
the additional authority to make adjustments and collections. The
California court based its decision on United States Glue Co. and
Shaffer as well as two other cases. 14 The Court found that these
cases established that the taxation of net income from interstate
commerce, as distinguished from the taxation of the privilege to
engage in interstate commerce, is not prohibited by the commerce
clause.
Other cases which have dealt with the question of the state
taxation of income from interstate commerce have concerned them-
selves with the fairness and reasonableness of the apportionment
formula established by the statute in question., The foreign cor-
porations involved have been domiciled in the taxing state, and the
issue whether they were subject to the income tax imposed has not
been in question. Substantial property had been employed in the
9 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); see also Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315
U.S. 649 (1942) (allowed nondiscriminatory tax on net income of a foreign corporation having a com-
mercial domicile in the state or on income derived from within the state).
10 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra note 9, at 445.
11 McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
12 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
isWest Publishing Co. v. McColgon, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), off'd per curiam, 328
U.S. 823 (1946).
14 Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 281 (1924); Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
15 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); cases cited at note 16 supra.
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state in each case, so there was clearly an obligation to the state for
the protection, benefits and opportunities being given. This line of
cases established merely that the apportionment formula used must
be reasonably related to the local activities of the taxpayer.
The chief requisite of a fairly apportioned taxing formula is
that it minimize the possibility of the imposition of multiple tax
burdens on interstate activities. For this reason, most formulas
based upon gross receipts rather than net income have been declared
unenforceable by the Supreme Court.16 The distinction between a
tax based upon gross receipts and one based upon net income was
defined in the United States Glue Co. case.17 A tax upon gross re-
ceipts, is essentially one on each transaction, depending upon its
magnitude, whether or not an actual profit was derived from such a
transaction. A taxing formula based upon such amounts, imposes a
tax even though no income has been earned in connection with the
operations being taxed. Tax formulas which have been declared
invalid have a common characteristic-that is, the imposition on an
activity of a burden which is capable of being imposed by every
state that particular activity touches. 8 Gross receipts formulas have
been upheld when applied to an intrastate incident sufficiently dis-
joined from interstate activities so that it could be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the apportionment was fair, and the taxpayer
was free from the cumulative burden threat."
To reiterate the guiding principles established by the cases re-
viewed, the state may assess the fruits of interstate commerce, in
order to defray the costs of local government, providing it does so
through a channel which does not conflict with Congress' exclusive
power to regulate the commerce among the states. In order to meet
this requirement the taxable activities must be sufficiently localized
to establish a relationship with the state that brings them within
the state's taxing power, and the tax levy must not unduly burden
the free flow of commerce across state lines nor favor local com-
merce. Do the tax levies questioned in the instant cases meet these
tests?
Mr. Justice Whittaker, in a particularly sharp dissent, stated
that the past decisions in this area are "remarkably consistent," and
16 Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434 (1939); Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
17 247 U.S. at 328.
18 Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
19 Norton Company v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
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careful analysis, understanding, categorizing, and application of
those decisions would result in a somewhat different conclusion.2 0
He noted that the following questions should be carefully examined
in applying the Court's opinions:
"(1) whether the tax was laid upon the general income of
a resident or domiciliary of the taxing State, (2) whether
the taxpayer's production, manufacturing, distribution or
management facilities, or some of them, were located in the
taxing State, (3) whether the taxpayer conducted both in-
trastate and interstate commerce in the taxing State, and if
so, (4) whether the tax was directly laid on income derived
from interstate commerce, or-what is the equivalent-on
the whole of the income, or whether the whole of the in-
come was used as one of the several factors in an apportion-
ment formula merely for the purpose of fairly measuring
the uncertain percentage or proportion of the total income
that was earned within the taxing State."'"
He distinguished all the cases relied upon in the majority opinion,
even the California case discussed above.2 2 In his opinion there
were certain activities which were purely intrastate. His reason for
dissenting was that the opinion was not based on precedent, but was
breaking new ground in an area expressly forbidden the states by
the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined with Mr. Justice Whittaker in
his dissent, and also added another reason for disagreeing with the
majority opinion."2 He found that taxation of the type of commer-
cial activity here involved would actively and unduly burden the
free flow of commerce among the states. His dissenting opinion
described the hardships that would be placed on thousands of small
and medium-sized corporations doing a small volume of business in
a number of states. The additional record-keeping requirements and
taxation costs, will, he felt, seriously impede interstate commerce by
discouraging selling in states where the volume does not justify the
inconveniences which will be involved. Another impediment will be
created through the increase of litigation involving the fairness and
reasonableness of apportionment formulas applied by taxing states.
In view of the extensive litigation now present in this area, this
argument is unquestionably valid.
Although the review of the cases has revealed that generally
the tax has been laid on a resident or domiciliary employing sub-
stantial property and capital in the state, this has not necessarily
been the test or guiding principle. Rather the test has been the
relationship between the commercial activity and the privileges and
protection provided by the state, coupled with the prohibition
against discrimination in favor of local commerce. 24 What brings a
commercial activity into the realm of the state's taxing power? The
case in question has found that the maintenance of a sales office for
2o 79 Sup. Ct. at 372.
21 Ibid.
22 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 328
U.S. 823 (1946).
23 79 Sup. Ct. at 379.
24 See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
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the solicitation of sales in the state "forms a sufficient nexus. '25
Yet, does a corporation which has not qualified to do business actu-
ally receive any benefits and protection from the state in which it
is carrying on its interstate business? The instant case holds that it
does, or at least it does if a substantial portion of the foreign cor-
poration's operations are transacted in the taxing state. What is
substantial? There has been no guide to help determine how sub-
stantial and voluminous such an operation must be in order to come
within the rule. Economists who have studied this question believe
that contacts such as the one now in question are too remote to
actually be considered as an integral part of the state's economy.
26
How far can the rule in this case be extended? Could it possibly be
construed to cover mail order operations and sales solicited by
traveling salesmen when there is no sales office located in the state?
These are some of the questions that will be coming up for further
litigation and determination by the courts.
From the economists' point of view, there are a number of valid
reasons why the rule established by this case can seriously impede
the free flow of commerce.2 7 One was mentioned by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter-that is, the inconvenience and expense of filing a
multitude of income tax returns. Also, there is the threat of creat-
ing multiple tax burdens. Another one mentioned was the ultimate
redistribution of tax resources throughout the states through the
divergent apportionment methods and the allowance of tax credits
by the various taxing authorities.
The solution suggested in Frankfurter's dissent is congressional
action which would restrict or impose well-defined limitations upon
the states' taxing powers in this area.2 8 This appears to be a stiff
measure, yet it comes within the power which is exclusively in Con-
gress if that body should wish to exercise it. In view of the fact that
thirty-five states have taxing measures which provide for a direct
tax levy on corporate net income, there is little question that many
organizations are going to find numerous new tax liabilities im-
posed upon them within the next few years. Probably the taxing
authorities in many states are going to find this source of revenue
is not sufficiently lucrative to make it worth the extra cost and
trouble of administering it. Yet, as they begin losing present sources
of revenue to other states, they may find it necessary to take ad-
vantage of this source. Unless some limitations are defined, there
will no doubt be some real effort to extend the effect of this decision
over situations far beyond the intention of the Court.
25 79 Sup. Ct. at 359.
26 Studenski and Glasser, New Threat In State Busines Taxation, Harv. Bus. Rev. Nov.-Dec., 1958,
p. 77.
27 Ibid.





Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-Legislature
Cannot Delegate Its Power to Define a Crime by Making Violation
of Rules and Regulations of Administrative Body a Crime.
By JOHN E. ARCHIBOLD
Casey was a defendant in a justice of the peace court prosecu-
tion for a misdemeanor arising from failure to obtain a trailer
court license. It was alleged that operation of his trailer court was
contrary to the rules and regulations of the Board of Health of
the Tri-County District Health Department. Violation of an order,
rule of regulation of a county or district health department was by
statute declared a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $1000, one
year in jail, or both.' A jury returned a verdict of guilty. Appeal
was taken to the county court where the defendant was again found
guilty. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of Colorado held:
reversed. The legislature cannot lawfully delegate its power of
defining a crime to the district or county health departments by
declaring violations of their orders, rules and regulations to be
crimes. Such action contravenes Article III of the Colorado Con-
stitution. Casey v. People, 336 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1959).
The Casey decision is a further manifestation of the vigor with
which the rule against delegation of legislative power is applied in
Colorado. The prohibition against the delegation of legislative pow-
er is a corollary of the separation of powers into legislative, exe-
cutive, and judicial departments. With the rise of administrative
agencies, the courts have had to cope with the problem of how
much administrative discretion can be exercised by such agencies
without an improper intrusion into the legislative function. The
general principle was stated in the 1892 case of Field v. Clark:
"The Legislature (Congress) cannot delegate its power to make a
law, but it can make a law to delegate its powers to determine
some fact or state of facts upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend."2 By this is meant that the legis-
lative body must declare its policy and establish sufficiently clear
standards within which the administrative body is to operate. The
principle of this case was strongly reiterated in all of the Colorado
cases cited in the Casey opinion.
In determining if the Field principle applies to the more spe-
cific issue of whether or not the legislative body can declare the
violation of a rule or regulation of an executive department or
agency to be a crime, a majority of federal and state cases have
taken a position contrary to that of the instant case. The United
States Supreme Court in 1911 upheld the power of Congress to de-
clare that violations of the rules and regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture with respect to grazing and forest regulation would
be punishable.3 Since then there have been decisions upholding
punishment for violations of the rules and regulations of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue4 and the O.P.A. Administrator.5 Pun-
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 66-2-14(1) (1953).
2 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
3 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
4 United States v. Tishman, 99 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 636 (1939).
5 United States v. Gruenwald, 66 F. Supp. 223 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
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ishment for disobeying an order of a local draft board has likewise
been sustained.' Apparently no federal case has held it to be an un-
constitutional delegation of power for Congress to declare that the
violation of a rule, regulation or order of a federal department or
agency results in a crime.
Although the Field principle has been more strictly applied
with respect to state cases, even here one finds that the Colorado
position exemplified in Casey is a minority one. A New York court,
upholding the conviction of a motorist who had violated a traffic
rule of the Palisades Interstate Park Commission, said that the le-
gislative policy declaring that violations of the rules and regula-
tions of the Commission would be misdemeanors was not an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power to define a crime. 7
The fact that the Director of Conservation of Alabama could change
the regulations "from time to time" did not deter the Alabama
court from upholding a criminal conviction under such regulations.'
The Missouri Supreme Court has said, "punitive laws or laws fixing
punishment as for violations of administrative rules are solely re-
ferrable to the legislative power and function, and an administrative
ruling may have the force of law in that violations thereof are pun-
ishable as public offenses.9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has said
what is practically the same thing.10
Massachusetts and New York have not only upheld, respective-
ly, the power of the Airport Commission, and the Bureau of Smoke
Control, to prescribe rules and regulations backed by criminal sanc-
tions, but they have even gone so far as to allow the administrative
agencies to fix the penalty, "up to $500" in the Massachusetts case,1
and "between $25 and $100 for the first offense" in the New York
case.
12
A minimum fair wage standard order of the Commissioner of
Labor and Industry of New Jersey was upheld in Lane v. Holder-
man.13 A federal district court, construing a Colorado statute14 rel-
ative to the unfair cancellation of motor vehicle dealer franchises,
stated by way of dictum that it was permissible for an adminis-
trative body to make rules and regulations, the violation of which
is a crime, provided the legislature sets up a primary standard.15 A
Florida case has said that before a person can be charged with a
criminal offense for violating an order of an administrative board,
the statutory provision permitting such an order should be strictly
complied with. 6
The Casey decision apparently stands alone. The author has
been unable to discover any other decision, federal or state, where
an appellate court has flatly and without qualification denied the
6 United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. III. 1942).
7 People v. Kontrowitz, 10 Misc. 2d 667, 173 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Rockland County Ct. 1958).
8 State v. Keel, 33 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d 625 (1948).
9 Marsh v. Bartlett, 342 Mo. 526, 121 S.W.2d 737 (1938).
10 Atchley v. Board of Barber Examiners, 208 Okla. 453, 257 P.2d 302 (1953).
11 Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E.2d 666 (1950).
12 People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 19521
13 40 N.J. Super. 329, 123 A.2d 56 (App. Div. 1956).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-11-14(10)(c) (Supp. 1957).
15 General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956).




power of the legislative body to declare that the violation of the
rules and regulations of an administrative body shall be a crime.
One cannot reasonably quarrel with the result in the Casey case,
for to allow a district health department to make rules and regula-
tions at will without a proper legislative standard, and then to make
a violation of such rules and regulations a crime, is a clear and un-
questioned disregard of the principle of Field v. Clark. The Casey
decision, in the opinion of the author, would have been more sat-
isfactory if it had been couched in terms of the legislature's failure
to prescribe sufficiently clear standards within which the county
and district health departments could lay down reasonable rules
and regulations. Had the legislature done this, its declaration that
violation of those rules and regulations would constitute a mis-
demeanor would not seem so objectionable. We can be grateful that
the Supreme Court of Colorado has not emasculated the sound
constitutional barrier against the delegation of legislative power,
as the New York and Massachusetts courts seem to have done.
Nevertheless, the language of the Casey opinion is unnecessarily
broad. Because of its failure to recognize careful distinctions, the
opinion puts Colorado out of step with other courts. This being so,
Casey stands as a weak precedent, and with the increasing import-
ance of governmental agencies, the Supreme Court of Colorado at
some future time may have to limit this ruling.
Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - Due Process
By EARNEST E. SCHNABEL
The defendants were indicted by the State of Illinois for violat-
ing an Illinois statute making it a crime to conspire to injure or
destroy the property of another.' Upon pleading guilty, each was
sentenced to three months imprisonment. Thereafter they were in-
dicted in a federal district court on a charge of violating a federal
statute2 by conspiring to willfully and maliciously injure or destroy
means of communications controlled or operated by the United
States. The defendants were found guilty as charged, although the
same criminal act had been involved in the first conviction. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the de-
fendants' claim that since the same acts were involved in the prior
state conviction they were twice put in jeopardy contrary to the
fifth amendment.3 The Court affirmed the second sentence, in a six
to three decision, holding that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
provision is not applicable to successive state and federal prosecu-
tions. Abbate v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 666 (1959).
The opinion of the three dissenting Justices declared that iden-
1 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 139 (1957). It provides in pertinent part: "If any two or more persons
conspire or agree together . . . with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to
injure the . . . property of another . . . they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy .... ".The
statute applies to conspiracies within Illinois to destroy property outside the state.
2 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire . . . to
commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
3 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
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tical conduct of an accused is but one offense, and cannot be pun-
ished by two separate sovereignties as two distinct offenses.
On the same day the principal case was decided, the Court, in
Bartkus v. Illinois,4 held that the subsequent trial of the defendant
in a state court, based on the same acts which had resulted in an
acquittal in a federal court, did not deprive the defendant of due
process under the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan, who
wrote the majority opinion in the Abbate case, dissented, in a five-
four decision, on the theory that the state trial of Bartkus was
essentially a second federal prosecution because of the extremely
active participation of federal officers in preparing and conducting
the trial. Such a second prosecution is, of course, barred by the
double jeopardy limitation on the national power.
Constitutional challenge to successive state and federal prose-
cutions based on the same conduct is not new to the courts.5 In
Houston v. Moore,6 an 1820 case, the defendant was indicted in a
state court for violating a state statute. His conduct was also a
crime against the national government. The Court discussed the
possibility of successive prosecutions, but upheld the defendant's
conviction on the ground that the state had concurrent jurisdiction
as long as the national government had not exercised its power.
In Fox v. Ohio,' United States v. Marigold," and Moore v. Illi-
nois,9 the Court, relying on the Houston case, gave clear expression
to the emerging principle that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause does not prohibit a federal prosecution which follows a state
prosecution for the same offense. The reasoning of the Court in
these cases was approved in principle in later Supreme Court deci-
sions.10
Climaxing this development was United States v. Lanza,"
where the issue of successive jurisdiction was squarely before the
Court. It was there held that the fifth amendment applied only to
successive prosecutions by the federal government. Subsequent
cases have reaffirmed the decision.1
2
It should be remembered that the principal case was a six to
three decision. This decision centered around the holding in the
Lanza case, which the Court refused to overrule. It pointed out that
if states were free to prosecute persons violating their laws, and thus
bar subsequent federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal
law enforcement would necessarily be hindered. A disparity would
arise when the defendant's acts impinged more seriously on the fed-
eral interest than on a state interest. An example is found in the
principal case: the state court sentenced each defendant to three
4 79 Sup. Ct. 676 (1959).
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. 313 (1844); Harlan v. People, 7 Doug. 207 (Mich.
1843); State v. Brown, 2 N.C. 100 (1794); State v. Antonio, 2 S.C. 776 (1816); Hendrich v. Common-
wealth, 32 Va. 707 (1834).
6 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 19 (1820).
7 46 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847).
850 U.S. (9 How.) 258 (1850).
9 55 U.S. (14 How.) 306 (1852).
10 These later decisions all affirm the principle in dicta only. See, e.g., Sexton v. California, 189
U.S. 319, 322-23 (1903); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1892); United States v.
Ariona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 518 (1878); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875).
11 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
12 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1942);
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
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months, while under the federal conviction each received one to
three years.
The dissenting opinion was critical of the decision in Lanza as
being based on dicta in prior cases. 13 These cases had assumed that
identical conduct might be prosecuted twice because the offense
punished by each was in some sense different. But the Justices in
the minority objected that the legal logic used to prove one act to
be two was too subtle for them to grasp. They would not accept the
majority view which saw no way out of the difficulty posed by a
state prosecution being allowed to destroy the federal power to
bring suit. In answer to the majority argument that a defendant
could plead guilty to the crime in the jurisdiction which provided
the lesser minimum penalty, the dissent pointed out that Congress
has the power to declare certain conduct criminal. Further, hav-
ing defined the crime, it could take exclusive jurisdiction for the
federal government, or allow states concurrent jurisdiction while
still setting minimum penalties applicable in all courts.
It was pointed out that the Bill of Rights, which safeguards
against double jeopardy, was intended to establish a broad national
policy against a federal court's trying an accused a second time after
a final judgment in any other court. The dissent noted that during
the first Congress when the Bill of Rights was being considered, a
proposed amendment, which was not adopted, apparently would
have barred double prosecutions for the "same offense" only if
brought under any laws of the United States.
1 4
The Bartkus case relied on the reasoning of the majority-
minority opinions of the principal case for the basis of its holding.
The only difference from Abbate is that in Bartkus there was an
acquittal in the federal court, and a subsequent conviction in the
state court for the same acts.
The history of court decisions relating to successive state and
federal prosecutions, whether in violation of the fifth or fourteenth
amendments, hinges upon the interpretations given by the courts in
the earlier cases of Houston v. Moore" and Fox v. Ohio.16 There is a
definite conflict as to the proper meaning of these cases. But with
regard to the result, there is little doubt. Our constitutional protec-
tions embodied in the double jeopardy and due process clauses have
been limited by the Court's holdings in the Abbate and Bartkus
cases.
13 See note 10 supro.
14 At the time the amendment was offered, the double jeopardy clause read: "No person shall
be subject . . . to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense." 1 Annals of Cong.
434 (1789). Had the amendment passed, the clause would read: "No person shall be subject . . . to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense by any law of the United States." Id. at
753.
15 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 19 (1820).
1646 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847).
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of the Laws - Cruel and
Unusual Punishment - Rights of Prisoners
By WILBUR SATO
Plaintiff, an inmate in a state prison, filed a complaint in a fed-
eral district court with an accompanying motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Specific allegations of the complaint, taken as true for the
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purposes of the motion, showed that the plaintiff was being subject-
ed to systematic segregation and discrimination solely on account of
his race. This, he contended, violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. He prayed that the
respondent prison officials be enjoined from continuing the alleged
abusive practices, or in the alternative, that he be transferred to
another prison where such practices did not exist.
Leave to proceed in forma pauperis being discretionary, the
court examined the merits of the claim, and concluded that, in view
of the extraordinary nature of the relief sought, the acts charged
did not show sufficient interference with the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights to justify judicial action. Leave to file the complaint
in forma pauperis was denied. Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Cal. 1959).
The court reasoned that the rationale of Brown v. Board of
Education' should not be applied to state penal institutions because
the extent and quality of the difficulties of prison administration
are not to be found in educational systems. This position was sup-
ported by citing authorities to the effect that federal courts are
loath to interfere with the discretion of officials charged with
administration of state prisons.
The constitutional guarantee of equality commands that a state
shall not enforce segregation solely on the basis of race,2 nor provide
for discrimination in publicly owned or supported facilities.3 Under
this rule racial discrimination is not to be allowed in public schools,'
buses,5 or in recreational6 and cultural7 facilities. Nor is it permissi-
ble in a privately created and supported orphans' school adminis-
tered by a public trustee.8 The state may not enforce a racially
restrictive covenant, 9 nor entertain a suit to recover for its breach."0
Nor may ownership of land be prohibited on the basis of race or
national origin.1' The right to engage in a business or occupation,"
or to practice one's profession 1 3 similarly may not be denied. Suf-
frage1 4 and immigration matters" are within the rule. A person
is denied due process of law in a criminal trial when members of
his race have been continuously and systematically excluded from
the jury lists. 6 The state cannot discriminate in the right to public
employment or compensation' 7 nor prohibit the association of races
by discriminatory zoning laws.'t And it has been held, although
not without dissent, that the state may not prohibit the marriage
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
3 Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
6 Moorhead v. Fort Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
7 Harris v. Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
8 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
O Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
10 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
11 Fulii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
12 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
13 Harvey v. Morgan, 272 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
14 McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947);
Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950).
15 Quan Hing Sun v. White, 254 Fed. 402 (9th Cir. 1918).
16 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 471 (1954).
17 Reynolds v. Board of Public Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945).
18 City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
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of persons of different races.19 This constitutional mandate also
provides that there be no discrimination because of race in the
punishment for a crime.
2 0
Equal protection of the laws, thus expressed, commands that
the exercise of state power in all its varied activities and pursuits
shall operate equally upon all, without regard to race, color, or na-
tional origin. The rationale of Brown v. Board of Education is not
limited to the facts of that case. And of course the broad policy of
the equal protection clause is not limited in application to educa-
tional institutions.
The statement that federal courts are loath to interfere with
the administraion of state prisons is misleading. Close examination
of the cases cited as supporting the proposition, where courts have
refused to intervene, discloses that this is the apparent rather than
the real reason for their refusals. Thus in Wagner v. Ragan21 the
Seventh Circuit said that it had no power to control or regulate the
ordinary internal discipline of prisons. In Adams v. Ellis22 it was
stated that withdrawal of rights in prisons is justified by considera-
tions underlying the prison system. Yaris v. Shaughnessy 23 held
that the complainant had not made out a case serious enough to
require court interference.
In Piccoli v. Board of Trustees2 where the petitioner was de-
nied the use and possession of law books he had purchased, the
court refused to hear an application for equitable relief, declaring
that only manifest oppression will justify judicial intervention, and
intervention may be had only to prevent irreparable injury that is
clear, imminent and substantial. From a reading of these and other
cases 25 the implication is clear that, though the courts, as a matter
of policy, are reluctant to intervene, prison administration will be
left to prison officials only so long as their conduct does not involve
deprivation of prisoners' constitutional rights or amount to treat-
ment that is clearly arbitrary or capricious. Thus in Davis v. Berry
2
the petitioner sued in federal disLrict court to restrain prison offi-
cials from performing a vasectomy on him. He alleged that the con-
templated operation violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The court concluded that the statute purporting
to authorize the operation denied due process, as alleged, because it
provided for the deprivation of a right without hearing, and further
that the effect of the operation was to impose cruel and unusual
punishment. Finding also that irreparable harm was threatened, the
court granted relief. Other cases27 hold that prison rules that inter-
fere with prisoners' rights of appeal or deny access to the courts
violate the equal protection clause.
19 Perez v. Lippold 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Contra, Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824,
36 So. 2d 140 (1948).
20 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
21 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954).
22 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952).
23 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
24 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949).
25 Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1953); Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir.
1952); Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957); Akomine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 294, 238 P.2d 606 (1951).
26 216 Fed. 413 (D.C. Iowa 1914).
27 Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Ex parte Hall, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
The enunciated principles of specific cases appear to place the
rights contended for in the main case within the protection of the
Constitution. Equality of protection implies that in the administra-
tion of criminal justice, no one shall be subjected, for the same class
of offense, to any greater or different punishment from that to
which others of the same class are subjected.2 8 Greater or different
punishment imposed on persons because of their race is therefore
prohibited.2 9 Due process of law contemplates that freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment be protected.3 0 Cruel and unusual
punishment has been defined as a changing concept which must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.
3 1
An examination of the facts 6f the instant case leaves little
room for doubt as to the application of the law. The allegations of
the complaint charged that the plaintiff was required to join in an
exclusively Negro line formation when proceeding to his assigned
cell block for daily lockup; that he was there lodged in an exclusive-
ly Negro cell; that he was required to join an exclusively Negro line
when proceeding into the prison dining hall; and that he was re-
quired to eat in a walled-off and exclusively Negro compartment in
the dining hall.
Though there is here no rack or thumbscrew, those are not the
only forms of cruel punishment.3 2 The degradation, humiliation, and
mental suffering imposed here can, in its consequences, be more
painful and more destructive than the most brutal physical abuse.
The harm is irreparable. This form of punishment is incongruous in
a society where equality before the law is a fundamental right. That
systematic segregation is also unequal protection is plain, for the
prisoner must, because of the segregation of his race, daily undergo
humiliation and mental suffering not shared by other prisoners.
Both reason and the Constitution oppose a palpably arbitrary and
capricious prison policy. In this care the defendant prison officials
made no appearance, and no justification for the offending rule was
mentioned. The plaintiff's claim clearly merits consideration.
28 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 335 (1921).
29 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883).
3o Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1946); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 255 (3rd Cir. 1949).
31 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
82 Ibid.; Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (D.C. Iowa 1914).
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Negligence-Automotive Repairers-Liability To Third Persons.
By SVEN L. JOHANSON
Plaintiff, a stranger to a repair contract between the defendant
garage and the lessor of a tractor unit, alleged that he suffered dam-
ges to his trailer when, due to the negligent repair of the tractor,
the tractor-trailor unit plunged off the highway. The defendant had
agreed with the lessor to do certain repair work on the tractor, and
improper connection of the right tie rod to its wheel after repairs
were completed caused the loss of control by the driver. The de-
fendant contended that the evidence failed to show privity of con-
tract between the plaintiff and defendant, or any duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant. The novel question before the Kansas
City Court of Appeals was whether the court should extend to auto-
motive repairers the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'
Held: Judgment for the plaintiff; privity of contract between the
parties is not requisite to recovery. Central & So. Truck Lines v.
Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Ct. of App., Mo.
1958).
The liability of negligent automotive repairmen to third parties
is now rapidly becoming accepted as the prevailing rule. It follows
the MacPherson doctrine by twenty-two years. In that leading case,
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, ruled that a man-
ufacturer owes the affirmative obligation to exercise reasonable
care in the manufacture of a chattel which is not necessarily dan-
gerous when made properly, but which may place life and limb in
peril when made negligently. If such manufacturer knows that the
chattel is likely to be used by persons other than the purchaser,
without subsequent tests, he is heldresponsible to such third parties
irrespective of a contract relationship.
Dean Prosser has stated2 that requiring privity of contract is the
result of misunderstanding the holding of Winterbottom v. Wright.,
He further has asserted that this is now but ancient history, and
that later decisions are agreed that negligent repair of a vehicle 4 or
any other chattel5 creates a liability in favor of third persons in-
jured by that negligence, as if the repairman had made and sold the
chattel in the first instance.
In Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp." the plaintiff was a pilot of
an airplane which the owner had requested the defendant to inspect
and repair. Defendant returned the plane after two weeks, thereby
impliedly warranting its fitness. Soon afterward, it crashed on a
take-off because of the defendant's negligent failure to make proper
1 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 Prosser, Torts 517 (2d ed. 1955).
3 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Here the defendant had contracted to keep certain mail coaches in
repair, and by reason of his failure to do so, a third person, the driver, not a party to the contract,
was injured.
4)Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th cir. 1939); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456,
46 S.E.2d 197 (1948); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657
(1933).




inspection and repairs. The trial court, on the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted, refused to find for the plaintiff. The appellate court re-
versed, saying pontifically, "This concept of non-liability was
spawned in the dicta of a breach of contract case and nourished in
the perpetration of the false notion that privity of contract is an in-
dispensable prerequisite to a manufacturer's actionable duty to
third parties."7 The 1946 case of Carter v. Yardley & Co." reviews
the history and transformation of the so-called "general rule."9
The Winterbottom case held that under the principles of con-
tract law there are many instances when a party is without remedy,
and hardship will not be sufficient justification to allow recovery.
"Hard cases, it has been observed, are apt to introduce bad law." 0
These early cases did not recognize a duty, outside of contract, for
the protection of a third person, except where there was nuisance,
or in rare cases involving a public duty. It was said that the only
safe rule was to confine the right of recovery to those who are
bound by contract, otherwise there would be no end to the absurd
and outrageous consequences that would result. The "obvious and
simple" solution to the plaintiff's plight was to make himself a party
to the contract. We now find this doctrine inconceivable, and fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of an act which
will affect some right of others, may result in a recovery in tort,
whether that act be one of commission or omission.
In a federal case", which was decided for the plaintiff, the de-
fendant was under a contract to keep in repair the trucks used by a
construction company. Plaintiff, a laborer on a company job, was
seriously injured when struck by one of the trucks. It had been im-
possible to warn him because the truck's horn was not operating.
Omission to keep the horn in working order was sufficient to estab-
lish the defendant's liability. The court held that inasmuch as the
truck was returned to the defendant each night for servicing there
was notice of the defect, and the defendant had a duty to exercise
reasonable care. The negligent breach of that duty created a lia-
bility for the resulting injury.
In Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co.,2 a garage contracted with
the owner of an automobile to repair a defective steering mechan-
ism. The garage failed to repair the defect but erroneously informed
the owner that it had been repaired when he later returned for the
car. On a trip the next day, a passenger was injured when the
steering apparatus failed and the automobile was wrecked. The
court refused to find a breach of duty to the injured passenger for
a mere omission to act.
There is a widely accepted position, consistent with that ap-
7 id. at 480.
8 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
9 See also Annot., 164 A.L.R. 569 (1946).
10 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (1842).
11 Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th cir. 1939).
12 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927).
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proved by Prosser,"8 which maintains that any person will be liable
who repairs personal property in such a negligent manner as to
render it likely to cause injury or property damage to third per-
sons. If, however, such repair is made, and the article returned to
its owner's exclusive possession and control in a condition not im-
minently dangerous, and the article is employed without event for
a reasonable period of time, injuries to third persons resulting from
the use of the article thereafter, will not expose the repairman to
liability.
Generally, in automotive repair cases, acceptance of the auto-
mobile by the owner is not a valid defense when the repair was not
known to be defective. In the first of two cases in point'1 4 the agents
of a motor company left a steering arm adjustment tool attached to
the automobile. It was held that the company could not escape lia-
bility for injuries sustained by the owner's guest. The defendant
had argued that the company was an independant contractor whose
repair work had been accepted by the owner. In the second case 15
the defendant alleged that the owner had accepted the automobile
upon completion of the work, and therefore the owner should be
substituted for the defendant as the party responsible to the plain-
tiff for any defect. The court held that the defendant repairman
would be held liable for the damages sustained by both the auto-
mobile owner and the plaintiff in the absence of proof that (a) the
work was completed and accepted by the owner, and (b) the owner
knew of the defective repair when he accepted the automobile, or
should have discovered the defect before the accidnt.
In Smith v. Roberts,16 the plaintiff, driver of a truck recently
repaired by the defendant, was approaching the bottom of a
down-grade when he discovered that the truck had no brakes. The
truck gained speed until it went out of control and was wrecked,
causing serious personal injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant
averred that there was no privity of contract between him and the
plaintiff as to repair of the truck and that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence. The court found no negligence in the con-
duct of the driver and held the defendant liable for the injuries
which resulted from the defective repairs.
Nine states"7 seem to allow recovery by third persons for dam-
ages and injuries due to negligent automotive repairs. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court has not yet considered a case of this nature. It
would seem however, in view of the prevailing trend, and, inasmuch
as there is a complete absence of recent opposition, that Colorado
would follow the principle of the instant case.
13 Prosser, Torts 517 (2d ed. 1955); 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 101 (1950).
14 Burket v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
15 Zierer v. Daniels, 40 NJ. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1956).
16 268 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1953).
17 Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1939) (failure to keep truck horn functioning;
substantive low of Mo.); Spolter v. Four Wheel Broke Service, 99 Cal. App. 2d 690, 222 P.2d 307
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (wheel lug bolts not secured); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46
S.E.2d 197 (1948) (negligent repair of steering gear and brakes); Smith v. Roberts, 268 S.W.2d 635
(Ky. 1953) (negligent reassembling of rear housing); Miller v. Margot, 42 So. 2d 916 (La. 1949)
(improper replacement of a tie rod); Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316
(1938) (failure to rrmove a tool attached to the steering arm); Central & So. Truck Lines v. Westfall
GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W. 841 (Mo. 1958) (improper replacement of tie rod); Zierer v. Daniels, 40
NJ. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1956) (negligently repaired brakes); Oliver v. Bereano, 293
N.Y. 930, 60 N.E.2d 134 (1944) (brakes); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 26r
N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (wheel came off); cf. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479
(10th cir. 1950) (failure to repair and inspect airplane; applying Kansas law).
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Negligence - Municipal Liability -
Failure to Provide Police Protection
By JOHN E. HARRINGTON
In response to a request for information contained in an F.B.I.
circular, Arnold Schuster informed the New York City police of the
whereabouts of Willie Sutton, a professional criminal of national
repute whom he had by chance seen on the street. As a result of
this information Sutton was arrested and Schuster's part in his
apprehension was given wide publicity. Almost at once Schuster
began receiving anonymous threats against his life. The police ar-
ranged protection for him at his place of employment and his home,
although they informed him that the calls were from cranks and
were "child's stuff." After several days the protection was with-
drawn and shortly afterward, nineteen days after Sutton was taken
into custody, Schuster was fatally shot by an unknown assailant.
The complaint in the instant wrongful death action alleged that
Schuster's death resulted from the actionable negligence of the city
in failing to use reasonable care for his safety. On appeal, the judg-
ment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint was reversed. Held: The complaint stated a cause of
action. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N. E.2d 534
(1958).
An ancient tenet in all systems of law is that which assures the
immunity of the sovereign from being called to account in his
courts.' But the erosion of modern interpretation has changed the
outline of this precept. In American law, absent a statute, a munici-
pality is liable for injuries resulting from negligent acts of its ser-
vants in the performance of proprietary duties but not for those
incurred in the performance of a governmental function. 2 The duty
to furnish police protection is a governmental function and not
merely corporate in character.'
Moreover, for some years prior to the instant case, New York
has had a statute which divested the state of immunity from suit.
4
As it is well settled that "none of the civil divisions of a state...
has any independent sovereignty,"'5 this statute makes the munici-
pality liable, equally with individuals and corporations, for wrongs
of its agents and employees."
Posed as the ground for the decision in the instant case is the
rule that, "If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a
benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists
.a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.
7
Mr. Justice McNally based his concurring opinion on the slight-
ly different common law doctrine that once the defendant has as-
1 Kawanonakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
2 Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Ore' 213, 88 P.2d 808 (1938).
3 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
4 New York Penal Code, § 8. "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions . . . against individuals or corporations ... "
5 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 1 604 (1945).
6 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1945).
7 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), quoting from Mach v. Rens-
selaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 166, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928).
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sumed to act, a duty arises to act carefully, even though the protec-
tion may have been gratuitous in the beginning and not the result
of a duty.8
One must assist in capturing a felon when opportunity presents,
at least When called upon to do so. This was written into our law
as early as 1285, in the Statute of Winchester.9 It is in response to
this duty, restated by the New York Penal Code, 10 that strict liability
is imposed upon the municipality for injury or death incurred by
one while helping the police at their direction. The facts of the in-
stant case place it outside the provisions of this law inasmuch as
Schuster volunteered his services, and his death occurred some days
later, but the policy which underlies the statute is clearly one of
solicitude for the safety of those private persons who aid the author-
ities in the exercise of the police function. It cannot be said that the
duty in the present case is solely in the interest of the person con-
cerned. It arises also from the need of the government, "that its
service shall be free from the adverse influence of force . . . 1
In New York, nonfeasance as well as misfeasance may constitute
negligence,1 2 and perhaps the Schuster decision was dictated by the
simple necessity of recognizing a duty of the municipality toward a
private citizen who by his affirmative act had aligned himself on
the side of the community, and whose representation should be giv-
en an opportunity to prove he lost his life as a proximate result of
the city's later failure to act in his behalf.
What would be the probable outcome of a Colorado case pre-
senting a fact situation similar to Schuster? McAuliffe v. City of
Victor" was a case of first impression in Colorado regarding the
question of municipal negligence in exercise of the police power,
and the Court reluctantly distinguished the possible liability arising
from negligence involving a proprietary function from the non-
liability of the municipality where a governmental function is at
issue. The Colorado Court followed this line until 1952 when two
decisions moved away from the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
it applies to contract actions.' 4 In the more recent case of Ace Fly-
ing Service v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,15 the Court accepted
the principle that when the state enters into authorized contractual
relations it thereby waives immunity from suit. But the non-liabil-
ity for negligence in the governmental capacity established by prior
cases 6 was unaffected by this decision.
8 154 N.E. 2d at 541 (concurring opinion). And see Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 258,
157 N.E. 129, 131 (1927); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 233, 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
9 Babington v. Yellow Cab Co., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928) (dictum).
10 New York Penal Code § 1848: "A person who, after having been lawfully commanded to aid
an officer in arresting any person . . . willfully neglects or refuses to aid such officer is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Where such command is obeyed and the person obeying it is killed or injured . . . the
person . . . so injured . . . or the personal representative of the person so killed shall have a cause
of action . . . against the municipal corporation by which such officer is employed ... "
11 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1894); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884).
12 Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956); McCrink v. City of New
York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
13 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900).
14 Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); State Highway
Dep't v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952).
15 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
16 Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 (1955); Atkinson v. Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 195
P.2d 977 (1948); Barker v. Denver, 113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945); McIntosh v. Denver, 98 Colo.
403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936); Moses v. Denver, 89 Colo. 608, 5 P.2d 581 (1931); Veraguth v. Denver, 19
Cola. App, 473, 78 Pac. 539 (1904).
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In Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n,1 7 which fol-
lowed Ace Flying Service by two months, the Colorado Supreme
Court cut loose entirely from the traditional sovereign immunity
doctrine insofar as contract actions were concerned, saying: "In
Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discus-
sion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this
court." 18 This could be only a persuasive dictum if applied in a case
involving liability under the police power, but it is permissible to
speculate that the vigor of the statement and its unqualified nature
presage a wider application of the view than a limitation to contract
law. This seems the more likely in view of Mr. Justice Moore's con-
curring opinion in Ace Flying Service stating that even in a tort
action the doctrine of sovereign immunity is contrary to the Colo-
rado constitutional guarantee of due process.1"
Perhaps Colorado will arrive at the same destination through
case law as that reached by New York through statute, 0 and require
the state to come into court in its own defense on equal footing with
all other contestants. But would Colorado courts place a duty upon
the municipality absent a statute imposing liability on the munici-
pality for injury resulting from intervention in the police function
at the direction of the police? Would a solicitation to act be seen in
the posting of a "wanted" circular, and a reciprocal duty on the part
of the community to protect the responding citizen?
The Schuster case is limited to a narrow segment of the law
and it seems unlikely that its specialized facts would soon be liti-
gated in another forum. The case is an interesting illustration of
the application of basic tort duty and negligence principles in a
novel fact situation, but it would be a rare case that could not be
distinguished from it through either the non-voluntary nature of the
informant's action or the quality of the protection given him by the
city. It seems likely that in future cases involving similar facts a
distinction will be made along these lines, with the courts following
the traditional view that nothing in the law imposes a special duty
upon the police to protect an individual citizen, and concluding that
there can be no liability where there was no duty.
17 136 Colo. 279, 316.P.2d 582 (1957), 34 DICTA 422.
18 Id. at 284, 316 P.2d at 585.
19 Ace Flying Service v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 29, 314 P.2d 278, 283 (1957)
(concurring opinion).
20 New York Penal Code, § 8.
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Witnesses - Competency - Husband and Wife -
Incompetency as Witness Against Spouse in Criminal Prosecution
By FRED J. MYERS
James Hawkins was indicted under the Mann Act 1 for trans-
porting a female in interstate commerce for immoral purposes.
When the government put Hawkins' wife on the witness stand to
testify against him, his counsel objected to her competence as a
witness. The objection was overruled and she was allowed to tes-
tify. She testified that she was a prostitute both before and after
her marriage to Hawkins. The defendant admitted that they had
never lived together for any appreciable length of time. On appeal,
the admission of the wife's testimony was held to be error. The
public policy of maintaining peace and harmony in domestic rela-
tions required the court to reaffirm the rule barring testimony of
one spouse against the other. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 78
(1958).
Neither this comment nor the Hawkins case contemplates the
privileged communication between husband and wife.2 Rather, both
refer to the rule regarding the competence of one spouse to testify
against the other.
At common law the wife was incompetent as a witness either
for or against her husband.3 An accused was disqualified as a wit-
ness on his own behalf because he was an interested party. It fol-
lowed from the legal fiction that husband and wife were one, that
she also was incompetent as a witness for .him. This does not ex-
plain why she could not testify against him. The reason is un-
known, but it has been suggested 4 that the most logical explanation
is to be found in the loyalty owed to th! husband as the head of the
paternalistic feudal family. Whatever the reason, the rule was well
settled. This does not mean that it was without exception, for it was
equally well settled that the rule did not apply when the husband
committed an offense against the person of his wife.
5
The rule and its exception were recognized early in this country
by the Supreme Court of the United States.6 Since that time both
have been greatly modified. In Funk v. United States7 the court
held that one spouse could testify for the other. The reason given
was that all disqualifications because of interest had been abolished.
Since an accused could now testify in his own behalf, there was no
longer any reason to bar the testimony of the spouse.
The exception has been made more inclusive. Originally it re-
ferred to crimes against the person of the wife. Bigamy is now
considered a crime against the wife." Importing an alien for im-
moral purposes is by statute made a crime against the wife.' Under
1 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
2 On that subject, see B Wigmore, Evidence J 2332 (1940).
8 Id. § 2227.
4 Ibid.
5 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 129 (1839).
6 Ibid. E
7 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
8 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
9 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1952).
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the Mann Act, the transportation of one's own wife in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes makes her a competent witness
against the husband." A crime has been committed against the
wife in the corrupting of her morals.-
The rule of disqualification has not been completely destroyed.
The instant case makes it clear that the present federal rule still
holds a wife incompetent to testify against her husband over his
objection when the crime is not one against her person.
The states are not completely in accord. A small but growing
minority of them have abandoned the rule. 12 Colorado is moving
away from the rule by a broader interpretation of the exception.
The pertinent Colorado statute 3 was first enacted before the turn
of the century and has been re-enacted verbatim ever since. In
Schell v. People4 the Supreme Court of Colorado held that bigamy
is a crime against the wife and allowed her to testify against her
husband. In Wilkinson v. People 5 the defendant was indicted for
the rape of his step-daughter. His wife, the girl's mother, was al-
lowed to testify against him. The court indicated that any rape by
the husband would be a crime against the wife. Logically it would
seem that the only crime committed against the wife, if any, would
be having intercourse with another woman. In O'Loughlin v. Peo-
ple'6 the defendant wife had murdered her step-son and her husband
was permitted to testify against her. The Colorado Court upheld the
conviction saying that the reason for the existence of the privilege,
the maintenance of domestic peace and harmony, had ceased to exist
in this case and therefore, the testimony was rightly received. The
court also said, in referring to the Wilkinson case, that if rape of a
step-daughter is a crime against the other spouse, then so is murder
of a step-son. By broadening the exception Colorado has moved fur-
ther from the spirit of the rule, and has taken a stand toward the
forefront of the growing view.
The facts of the Hawkins case presented the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to change the federal rule and they failed to
do so. There was no domestic peace or harmony to preserve. The
Hawkins' relationship was more that of procurer and prostitute
than husband and wife; therefore, in this case there was no reason
for maintaining the rule. The government wanted to modify the
rule by transforming it into a privilege, not of the accused, but of
his spouse. She would then be competent to testify over his objec-
tion, but not be compellable by the government. This would not
destroy the domestic peace and harmony of any marriage worth
savi.g and would aid the discovery of all pertinent facts.
l0 Hays v. United States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed. 665
(9th Cir. 1914).
1-1 This would appear to be true regardless of the wife's moral character prior to the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce; no case was found which discusses her prior character.
12 For a survey of the varied state rules see Note, 38 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1952).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-7(1) (1953). The pertinent language reads: "A husband shall not be
examined for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent; . . . but this exception does not apply . . . to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the other."
14 65 Colo. 116, 173 Pac. 1141 (1918).
15 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929).
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and his LL.B. degree from Westminster College of Law in 1934. He is a
member of the American, Colorado, and Denver Bar Associations and is
a partner in the Denver firm of Henry and Keating.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1959 regular session of the Colorado General Assembly
there were an average number of bills introduced, a more than
average number printed, and an average number enacted into law.
However, of 306 bills which received the approval of both houses,
222 had not been acted upon by the governor at the time of adjourn-
ment, which means that about seventy-five per cent of the bills
which did receive the approval of the general assembly received
their final action during the last few days of the session. This is far
more bills than usually receive final approval during that period.
When one considers the great length of this session, it would appear
that an unusually low number of bills received final action during
the early part of the session.
One explanation of this is the failure of the Judiciary Commit-
tees of the House and Senate to meet and take action. Both of these
committees found it very difficult to meet and have a quorum pres-
ent, and this delayed action on the great number of bills in these
committees. The House Judiciary Committee had nineteen mem-
bers, many of whom were on other important committees, and found
it most difficult to gather the required quorum of ten members.
However, once the Judiciary Committee did act, we found the Cal-
endar Committee of the Senate and the Rules Committee of the
House most cooperative in getting bar-sponsored bills on the calen-
dar for floor action.
There were some bills which were introduced, and some which
passed one house, which did not receive final approval for no ap-
parent reason. They were bills which seemed to have merit and no
known opposition. It is possible that these bills failed simply be-
cause of inadequate time in committee meetings.
The Legislative Committee of the Denver Bar Association intro-
duced thirty-two bills. Of these, one bill relating to estates of mental
incompetents was killed in committee, one relating to chattel mort-
gages was killed in floor action, and one relating to notice of final
settlement was vetoed by the governor. Two bills did not pass in
the form introduced by the bar committee, but two alternate bills
substantially similar did pass. Therefore, it is proper to say that of
thirty-two bills introduced by the Denver Bar Association Legisla-
tive Committee, only three failed of passage-a significant record,
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particularly in view of the fact that this was probably the largest
number of bills ever introduced by the Denver Bar Association
Legislative Committee.
The Denver Bar Association bills came from many sources. Of
fourteen probate and trust bills introduced, seven came from the
Probate and Trust Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association.
Bills were suggested by judges, attorneys, and other committees and
sections of the bar. The Legislative Committee acted as an advocate
of the bar. If an idea was suggested to the committee, it was as-
signed to a committee member to put into bill form. Such draft bill,
or any bill presented to the committee in original draft, was thor-
oughly discussed and revised by the committee, sometimes several
times, and the final form then agreed upon by the committee was
presented to a senator or representative for introduction into the
general assembly. Even after introduction into the general assem-
bly, the bill was not free from the possibility of amendment prior
to final passage. Bills were often changed substantially from the
time of first introduction to the committee and before a final draft
was eventually presented to the general assembly.
To give some example of how the committee worked, only two
bills which I presented to the committee-one on the title of a good
faith purchaser under a probate court decree and the other on
notaries public-were my original idea and were presented to the
general assembly in substantially the same form in which I pre-
sented the idea to the committee. Yet, I had a hand in drafting ten
of the bills presented by the committee. In all but these two cases,
the bill upon which I worked was either not my original idea, or
was so changed by the committee during the course of drafting that
it did not contain my idea at completion. In the case of one probate
bill, I opposed the idea when it was first presented to the committee.
In spite of this I was assigned the task of drafting the idea into a
bill and then lobbying it thru the general assembly. So I substan-
tially helped write into law an idea to which I was opposed and to
which I am still opposed.
One of the bills presented by the Legislative Committee, Senate
Bill 176, which would have eliminated published notice of final
settlement in certain cases, was vetoed by the governor. The gov-
ernor gave as his reason that the bill violated well-established prin-
ciples of giving notice. This, of course, is not true. The bill protect-
ed the right of every person who had an established right in the
estate to receive a notice of final settlement. Before drawing the
bill we checked the Model Probate Code and the probate laws of
many other states and found that they do not have the useless pub-
lished notice of final settlement which we were trying to do away
with by this bill.
Following is a list of bills which I believe will be of interest to
the average practicing attorney. House Bill is abbreviated to "H.B.",
and Senate Bill to "S.B." "D.B.A." refers to bills introduced by the
Denver Bar Association Legislative Committee. Since the governor
has not yet completed action on bills, some of these bills could still
be vetoed.
Bills of the Denver Bar Association were introduced in the
House by Representatives Robert E. Holland and Jane Woodhouse,
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and in the Senate by Senators Charles Bennett, Sam Taylor, Ranger
Rogers and Wilkie Ham, and our gratitude goes to them and many
other fine representatives and senators who 6ooperated with us so
well.
PROBATE AND TRUST LAW
H.B. 144. The property of an illegitimate child will descend to
his father as well as his mother, and an illegitimate may inherit
from his father as well as his mother, if the father has acknowl-
edged the child, and it is no longer necessary for the parents to
intermarry before the illegitimate child can inherit from the father
or the father inherit from the illegitimate child.
H.B. 233. D.B.A. Every agreement to make a will or to refrain
from making or revoking a will shall be void unless such agreement
is in writing and signed by the party charged therewith. Wills con-
taining mutual or reciprocal provisions shall not be any evidence
that such wills were made in consideration of each other.
H.B. 235. D.B.A. If a decree of heirship is entered relying on
intestacy, or if a decree probating a will, or denying probate to a
will, is entered, and such decree is subsequently set aside or modi-
fied, such setting aside or modification shall not impair the rights of
any person who, in reliance upon such first decree, in good faith, for
value, and without notice, purchased property or acquired a lien
upon property. If the person subsequently determined to be. entitled
to the property cannot recover it, he may recover an equitable
amount from the person who first received the property, and may
have an action in damages against any person who has unlawfully
or negligently failed to present any will for probate.
H.B. 237. D.B.A. Gives legal authority to the probate court to
enter an order of partial distribution in an estate.
H.B. 241. D.B.A. The court may, after the filing of a claim
against an estate, require subsequent proceedings in connection
with such claim, including trial, to be conducted in accordance
with the rules of civil procedure.
H.B. 242. D.B.A. Revision of the small estates law. Increases
the amount distributable without administration to 1,500 dollars,
except that where distribution is made to a widow or minor chil-
dren under widow's or minors' allowance, the amount could be up
to the amount of the allowance or 3,500 dollars. This act requires
more information in the petition for distribution than was formerly
required, prohibits the filing of a petition until thirty days after
death, and specifies with more particularity the persons to whom
such an estate may be distributed. It also permits the setting aside
of such an order wihin six months, but the setting aside of such
order shall not affect the title of any good faith purchaser of any
asset distributed under the order so set aside.
H.B. 245. D.B.A. After the expiration of the period for filing
fifth class claims, a claimant or any person in interest may petition
the court for an order to pay claims. The court shall order the pay-
ment of such claims as should be paid, and the personal represen-
tative may be penalized for failure to comply with such order.
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H.B. 398. Uniform act for the simplification of fiduciary se-
curity transfers. Simplifies the transfer of securities by a fiduciary
and removes some of the obligations formerly imposed upon a
transfer agent to determine whether or not the proposed transfer
was being made to a proper person.
H.B. 410. Permits original wills to be reproduced on film as a
permanent record, in lieu of the former requirement that they
could be preserved only in a well bound book.
S.B. 172. D.B.A. A testator may devise or bequeath property
to a trustee even though the trust is subject to subsequent modifi-
cation or amendment. Unless the will otherwise provides, the prop-
erty paid into the trust by virtue of the will, will be governed by
the terms of the trust as they exist at the time of death, even though
such terms have been changed subsequent to the execution of the
will.
S.B. 173. D.B.A. A policy of life insurance may designate as
beneficiary or alternate beneficiary the trustee of a living trust
agreement, or the trustee named in or ascertainable under the will
of the insured. The insurance proceeds so paid shall, so far as cred-
itors and inheritance tax are concerned, retain the attributes of
life insurance proceeds.
S.B. 174. D.B.A. The beneficiary of an estate may disclaim the
whole or any part of the benefits from such estate. Such disclaimer
must be made in writing. It is not necessary to make such disclaim-
er within six months, but if made within six months after probate
of a will, or the appointment of an administrator in an intestate
estate, such disclaimer is retroactive to date of death.
S.B. 181. D.B.A. If a Colorado court appoints a foreign per-
sonal representative for a nonresident decedent or ward, the debtor
or holder of property of that nonresident decedent or ward may,
upn order of the court which made the appointment, pay his in-
debtedness or deliver the property held to the foreign personal
representative, if no demand has been made by a resident creditor
or personal representative within six months from the date of ap-
pointment of the foreign personal representative.
S.B. 271. D.B.A. Actions brought for the recovery of real es-
tate shall survive and may be brought or continued notwithstand-
ing the death of the person in favor of or against whom such action
has accrued.
S.B. 178. D.B.A. A guardian of the person has no control over
the property of his ward, such being the exclusive function of the
court-appointed guardian of the estate. The act puts the mother on
an equal footing with the father in the right to administer a minor
child's estate. If the father, mother or ward over the age of fourteen
can be served with personal service in Colorado and does not join
in the petition, he must be notified of the petition for appointment.
A temporary guardian can be appointed.
S.B. 175. D.B.A. A very technical revision of the uniform prin-
cipal and income act to clarify the allocation between principal and
income of nartial liouidations of corporations.
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INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAXES
H.B. 243. D.B.A. Increases to 3,000 dollars the annual exclu-
sion in computing state gift taxes, in the case of any gift to any
class A beneficiary. Makes the state law conform to federal law
in classifying gifts -to minors as being not gifts of future interests
in certain cases.
H.B. 231. D.B.A. Eliminates the necessity for giving the in-
heritance tax commissioner the thirteen month notice of election
to take the optional valuation date. The election is now made by
filing the amended return, showing the election, within fifteen
months after death.
S.B. 282. The department of revenue may charge a fee of one
dollar for issuing a duplicate release of inheritance tax or an amend-
ed or corrected release if not made necessary by an error of the
inheritance tax division. This may be a revenue raising measure
improperly introduced in the Senate contrary to the state constitu-
tion.
S.B. 283. Revises the fees payable for an inheritance tax certi-
ficate of non-liability in an estate where no inheritance tax is pay-
able, on estates in excess of 5,000 dollars. The former schedule of
fees of ten and twenty dollars in such cases is revised to a scale
running from seven and one-half to thirty dollars. This may be a
revenue-raising measure improperly introduced in the Senate con-
trary to the state constitution.
REAL ESTATE TITLES
S.B. 169. D.B.A. Failure to comply with the provisions of the
realty recording act shall not affect or impair the constructive no-
tice arising from the filing for record of any instrument.
S.B. 177. D.B.A. Any instrument affecting the title to real
property, after being recorded in the proper county, shall be notice
to all persons, even though such instrument is not acknowledged
or is defectively acknowledged. Any instrument of record for ten
years, even though unacknowledged or defectively acknowledged.
shall be deemed to have been properly acknowledged.
S.B. 205. D.B.A. There must be recorded in every county in
which a corporation owns real property, a certified copy of the ar-
ticles of incorporation, amendment thereto composite articles.
certificate of merger, dissolution, etc.
MISCELLANEOUS
H.B. 234. D.B.A. "Registered mail", as contained in any stat-
ute, unless the context of the statute otherwise requires, is defined
to include certified mail.
H.B. 232. D.B.A. After July 1, 1959, a notary public will file
his oath and bond with the secretary of state, not the county clerk
and recorder. On his seal he will have "State of Colorado" instead
of the name of a county. His bond must be a surety company bond.
He may file a certified copy of his appointment, oath and bond in
any countv. A certificate of maaistracv mav be issued by any court-
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ty clerk, clerk or judge of any court of record, or the secretary of
state. Generally, in all respects the notary public will be a state of-
ficer and not tied to any county.
H.B. 239. D.B.A. Defines "minor" in any statute where the
context of the statute does not otherwise require, to be any person
under the age of twenty-one years.
H.B. 236. D.B.A. To hold personal property in joint tenancy
it is necessary to use only the words "joint tenancy" or "joint ten-
ants". Words relating to survivorship or tenancy in common are
not required to be used.
H.B. 244. D.B.A. A civil action pending in any court of record
may be transferred with the express consent of all parties to any
other county wherein the court finds the proceedings could be more
expeditiously continued.
S.B. 171. D.B.A. Relates to inventory chattel mortgages. Such
a chattel mortgage may be given on after-acquired or after-produc-
ed property. A mortgagor retaining possession of such mortgaged
property who does not account to the mortgagee for the proceeds of
sale or disposition is guilty of larceny.
S.B. 180. D.B.A. Exempts from the present accounts receiv-
able law assignments of rent taken in connection with real estate
mortgages. Permits assignment of all accounts receivable of a debt-
or without the necessity of describing each account in detail. Per-
mits accounts to be assigned with level payments to be made even
though less than the amount collected by the assignor is applied on
the reduction of the loan. An assignor who collects an account and
fails to pay the proceeds to the assignee according to the terms of
the assignment is guilty of larceny.
S.B. 182. D.B.A. When an appeal is taken from a justice of
the peace to a county or superior court, the clerk shall mail a no-
tice to the appellee, who must appear and pay his docket fee, and
if the appellee fails to do so default may be entered against him,
and the case disposed of accordingly. In the case of a criminal ap-
peal from a justice of the peace, the judge, not the jury, fixes the
punishment.
S.B. 201. D.B.A. Reenacts a provision for merger of corpora-
tions not for profit inadvertently repealed by the 1958 business
corporations law.
S.B. 216. A bill presented by the Corporations Committee of
SIXTEENTH STREET AT CHAMPA
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the Colorado Bar Association and incorporating approximately
twenty-five amendments to the 1958 business corporations act
which have been found by the committee to be necessary after the
enactment of the 1958 law.
H.B. 212. Presented by the Administrative Law Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association. This is an administrative procedure
act applying to state agencies where no specific statutory provision
to the contrary is now in existence. It provides for rule making,
the conduct of hearings before agencies, procedure on revocation
and suspension of licenses, and judicial review of agency decisions.
H.B. 194. Supported by Colorado Bar Association. Provides
for law clerks for the judges of the Supreme Court.
S.B. 127. Establishes the position of judicial administrator of
the courts.
H.B. 126. Alternate to D.B.A. bill. The director of public in-
stitutions shall maintain an index of each adjudication of incom-
petency or competency of any mentally ill or mentally deficient
person, and supply this information to persons requesting it. Each
clerk of a county court must forward the required information
from his court.
H.B. 127. Alternate to D.B.A. bill. In cases of temporary hos-
pitalization as mentally ill, the records shall be kept separate from
records of other cases in the county court. Upon release of any
such person, the record shall be sealed and the name of the respond-
ent omitted from the index of cases in such court, unless the res-
pondent is adjudicated as incompetent.
H.B. 131. Increases the number of district judges for Denver
from nine to ten.
H.B. 164. A person charged with murder may plead guilty
to second degree murder, and such plea may be accepted with the
consent of the judge and the district attorney.
H.B. 332. Completely redefines the property exempt from
attachment, execution and garnishment.
H.B. 378. Permits reimbursement of a district judge serving
outside his own district or a county judge serving outside his own
county for his actual and necessary personal maintenance, not to
exceed twenty-five dollars a day and mileage at the rate of eight
cents per mile.
S.B. 73. A minor who is charged solely with the violation of
a traffic law of the state or traffic ordinance of any city, town or
village shall be subject to the traffic court rather than the juvenile
court.
S.B. 72. The subject matter of every ordinance which may
be adopted pursuant to authority conferred by state statute shall
be considered to be a matter of local and municipal concern. Where
the subject matter of legislation may be of local and municipal con-
cern and also statewide concern, the existence of statewide legisla-
tion shall not deprive any municipal corporation of the right to
make an ordinance thereon, unless it is expressly declared by stat-
ute that only the state shall have power to adopt legislation there-
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on. Any act punishable both as a violation of a municipal ordinance
and state statute shall not be prosecuted under both, and prosecu-
tion under one shall bar prosecution under the other.
S.B. 222. In any action pending before any police magistrate
court or municipal court in which a party is entitled to a jury trial,
the party may have a jury summoned to try the same in the same
manner provided for the summoning of jurors to try causes before
a justice of the peace.
SOME COMMENTS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES
A number of bills were introduced which related in some way
to administrative practice and procedure. Some of these bills would
have set up new boards to regulate, license and administer laws in
the various fields. Others would have amended existing provisions
and revised existing laws relating to administrative practices.
Among the bills which were introduced but not passed, which
would have placed the state in new areas of administrative prac-
tice, were bills relating to driver education, contracting, ski tows,
plumbing, private detectives, and the application of agricultural
chemicals. Bills which did pass which related to administrative
procedure in some form were House Bill 114 relating to architec-
ture, House Bill 157 relating to physical therapy, House Bill 215
relating to accountancy, House Bill 221 relating to engineering,
House Bill 292 relating to opthalmology, House Bill 357 relating to
nursing homes, House Bill 404 relating to electricians, Senate Bill
58 relating to game and fish, Senate Bill 99 relating to optometry,
Senate Bill 119 relating to chiropractic, Senate Bill 183 relating to
surplus property agency, Senate Bill 241 relating to workmen's
compensation, and Senate Bill 221 relating to dentistry.
These comments are made to call your attention to the ever-
increasing importance of the field of administrative law in this
state.
OTHER COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION BILLS
Reference has been made above to the administrative proced-
ure act and the amendments to the corporation law sponsored by
the Colorado Bar Association. Senate Bill 244, providing for the
hospitalization of alcoholics, sponsored by the subcommittee on al-
coholism, was killed in the House Rules Committee. Numerous
bills were introduced affecting justices of the peace in various ways.
These bills were the subject of intensive committee action and con-
siderable floor debate, but none of them passed. The Colorado Bar
Association advocated the extension of life of the Judicial Council.
Such a bill was not passed. However, Senate Joint Resolution 16,
providing for a subcommittee of the Legislative Council to study
the judicial system of the state and make report to future sessions
of the general assembly, was passed. In addition Senate Bill 127
and House Bill 194 above referred to, did pass. A proposal of the
criminal law committee providing that a defendant in a criminal
matter might obtain copies of any signed statements made by him
did not pass. A more elaborate proposal giving a defendant access
to more information in the hands of the prosecutor passed the
House but was killed in Senate committee.
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THE COLORADO STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
By Roy H. MCVICKER
Roy H. McVicker received his LL.B. degree from Columbia University in
1950. He is a member of the Colorado Senate and a resident of Wheat-
ridge, where he is a partner in the firm of McVicker and Shannon.
Senate Joint Resolution 16 which established the Colorado
Legislative Study on the Administration of Justice contains this
preamble:
"Whereas, Colorado's Judicial System has remained
basically unchanged since the achievement of statehood
despite the growth in state population and the increase
of the number and the complexity of legal actions and of
the administration of justice; and
"Whereas, Preliminary and partial studies made by
the Judicial Council, the Colorado Bar Association, the
Legislative Council and other organizations and interested
citizens have shown that the Colorado Judicial System is
not functioning properly to the end that justice is administ-
ered speedily and equitably to all; and
"Whereas, Any changes in the judicial system, either
civil or criminal, must be viewed within the whole judicial
framework ......
This introduction to the resolution is self-explanatory to law-
yers. The congested conditions of dockets, especially in metropolitan
centers and at the Supreme Court level; the unequal distribution
of case loads in the various courts throughout the state; the con-
tinuing increase in the number of district judges while the number
of Supreme Court justices remains static; the increase of population
in the state of Colorado during the past fifty years from 670,000 to
1,750,000 with a corresponding increase in legal work and litiga-
tion; the inflexibility of our constitutional provisions governing
the judiciary and the sporadic patchwork treatment afforded the
judicial article by the legislature-these facts of life glare at any-
one who inquires into the need for reform of our judicial system.
Nor are these problems unique to Colorado. A number of other
states have either embarked upon or completed reform of their ju-
dicial systems. New Jersey, Kentucky, Florida, New York, Louisi-
ana and North Dakota lead the states in taking the initiative in the
study and reform of their judiciary. The Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration of New York University has achieved a national repu-
tation as an instigator and channeling board for data and ideas on
judicial reform.
In our own state, on November 5, 1957, the Governor issued an
executive order creating a Governor's Judicial Conference, and
appointing as chairman the then Chief Justice of the Colorado
-qunreme Court. 0. Otto Moore who. in the writer's opinion, is more
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responsible for the expanded interest in this problem than any oth-
er person. The Judicial Council quickly took shape under Mr. Jus-
tice Moore's leadership. In 1958 the scope and immediacy of its
study was considered of such importance by the legislature that it
was made a statutory body.
The first report of the Judicial Council, given to the 1959 legis-
lature, detailed recommendations in specific areas of immediate
need for judicial reform, but the Council in its report recognized
that it was hampered by the lack of adequate statistical information
concerning Colorado courts. It was the hope of the Council that
complete and detailed statistical information concerning case loads,
nature of cases and other pertinent matters could be obtained for
future study. Many of the recommendations of the Council ended
with the knowledge that needed reform was hamstrung by a hodge-
podge of constitutional provisions scattered throughout the entire
body of the state constitution. Suggesting statutory changes by the
legislature would be a prime requisite of the Council's findings.
As a result of these findings, the writer, being one of the re-
presentatives of the Colorado Senate on the Judicial Council, was
directed by the Council to prepare a resolution for the legislature
encompassing the whole area of the judicial study and providing
for necessary funds to properly gain essential data.
The timing for this resolution seemed to be just about right as
several other facets of interest became increasingly engrossed in
the need for such a study. Various inquiries of the Colorado Bar
Association into specific aspects of the judicial article contained the
notation that only a thorough overall study of the judiciary could
properly lead to any common sense solution of singular problems
within the judicial system. The late Merrill Knight, as Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee of the bar, in 1957 reported the feeling
of his committee that a review of the total judicial article was of
utmost importance.
The study of the justice of the peace system of this state by the
Colorado Bar Association and by a special Legislative Council com-
mittee came to a head in the 1959 legislative session, but to no avail.
The primary reason for the failure of the legislature to pass any
J.P. reforms was due to their uncertainty as to the effect of re-
vamping the J.P. system upon the rest of the court structures.
At the same time, increasing interest in criminal procedure
and the criminal code by the legislature and continuing bar studies
jelled in an awareness that here also was a problem in which only
a re-look at the totality of the judiciary could afford any accept-
able answer to obvious problems. This "glamorous" area of the
courts, especially where the press is concerned, received great at-
tention in the last session, and the efforts by individual legislators
to change specific parts of the criminal code were of real assistance
in helping to focus the attention of the public and the legislature
on the fact that the whole area of the judiciary needed an extensive
review and study.
Court services received their fair share of legislative musings,
but with increased deftness. Advances in the institutional and re-
habilitation programs of the state accomplished by the 1959 legis-
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lature resulted in many inquiries-some, almost dedications-by
legislators into reform in the areas of sentencing, probation and
parole.
All roads do lead to Rome, and in our case the focal point of
all these interests resulted in Senate Joint Resolution 16 calling for
an overall study of the Colorado judicial system, the criminal code
and procedures, and related court services. The sum of $20,000
was appropriated for the study during the balance of 1959.
Pursuant to the resolution, the Study Committee has now been
appointed by the Legislative Council, the research arm of the legis-
lature. The Study Committee is chaired by one of the finest mem-
bers of the Senate, Senator Carl Fulgham. The Vice-Chairman is
deservedly acclaimed an outstanding legislator - Representative
Albert Tomsic. The other members of the committee are: Senators
Bennett, Clarke, Cook, McVicker, Rogers and Wenke; and Repre-
senatives Byrne, Dolan, Dominick, Douglass, Holland, Kane and
Stalker.
The immediate job of the new committee will be the appoint-
ment of an advisory committee consisting of individuals represent-
ing a cross-section of knowledge and interest in this field. Speci-
fically, the resolution calls upon the Judicial Council, the Supreme
Court, the District Judges Association, the County Judges Associa-
tion, the Justice of the Peace Association, the District Attorneys
Association, the Colorado Bar Association, the law schools of Colo-
rado, the Colorado Probation, Parole and Correction Association
and other similar agencies and groups to be a part of and included
within the structure of the study. In the writer's opinion, the legis-
lative group and its advisory group should act as a single entity in
the conduct of the study. Obviously this overall study aimed at re-
form of our entire judicial system must be keenly timed to the in-
terest and have the active participation of these organizations.
As soon as the legislative and advisory groups become a work-
ing entity, their immediate job-and perhaps this is the most im-
portant part of the entire project-will be to organize the study and
to determine the priorities and timings of its various aspects. Even
a short reflection on the magnitude of the task encompassed by the
resolution will convince anyone that the committee must deal wise-
ly with the manner in which it structures its study. The area is so
wide and the matter is so fundamental to our citizens' basic rights,
indeed to the whole orderly disposition of justice, that an attempt
by the committee to do everything all at once could result in noth-
ing being accomplished, at a great cost of time and money.
Probably the first emphasis of the study will be the judicial
article. Here we face the practical consideration that in this field
we look forward to a constitutional amendment providing a more
flexible and workable framework for our judicial system while pre-
serving and protecting the basic delineation of the judiciary within
our governmental makeup. Properly preparing an amendment and
then organizing the spade-work, both for placing such an amend-
ment on the ballot as well as securing its adoption by an education-
al program throughout the state is a nice little piece of work in it-
self. It will require much time, planning, effort and money, but
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above all, it will require intelligent and dedicated time and effort.
The areas of criminal law and criminal procedure are well adapt-
ed to investigation by special committees to report back to the ov-
erall study group. The matter of judicial services, including the
question of indeterminate sentences and the function of probation
and parole will probably be the study of a special group, also re-
lating itself back to the main study group.
At all stages of this study, the Colorado Bar Association and
its local bar associations must play a vital part.
This study deals with lawyers' bread and butter. We are re-
shaping the tools of our trade. The results of the study must be
common knowledge to the citizens of this state. This educational
phase can be accomplished only at the local level and must be
sparked primarily by individual lawyers. Without genuine interest
and active participation from the legal profession, this study will
result in nothing, and it would be better that it had never been
undertaken.
In this regard, consider the remarks made by the Chief Justice
of the United States before the American Bar Association on Aug-
ust 25, 1958, as quoted by Mr. Justice Moore in his transmittal let-
ter of the Judicial Council report to the Board of Governors of the
Colorado Bar Association:
"Interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts
are today compromising the basic legal rights of countless
thousands of Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the
very foundations of constitutional government in the Unit-
ed States. Today, because the legal remedies of many of our
people can be realized only after they have sallowed with
the passage of time, they are mere forms of justice. And,
to the extent that this is so, there is created a disrespect for
law at a time when everyone should be continuously con-
scious of the fundamental principle that it is primarily the
law and its adequate enforcement which makes individual
liberty possible."
Reflecting upon the Chief Justice's speech, Mr. Justice Moore
commented:
"The responsibility of effecting the swift administra-
tion of justice was placed squarely on the legal profession
by the Chief Justice. 'Inaction from within our profession,'
according to Chief Justice Warren, must, of necessity,
bring about action from without, and if that is done, it will
occur at a time when there is a serious malady of the ju-
diciary machinery. It will involve many misunderstandings.
It will be done in haste, if not in hysteria, and without deep
appreciation of the elements of the problem. The Chief Jus-
tice further observed that, 'if we who have the prime res-
ponsibility for the administration of justice will join to-
gether in the common cause, we can provide the remedies
that are needed. We can do this in a manner that will not
only be orderly, but one that will increase the confidence
of the American people in both our courts-state as well
as federal-and in the profession as a whole.'"
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THE "CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND" IDEA
By KENNETH M. WORMWOOD
Kenneth M. Wormwood received his LL.B. degree from the University of
Denver College of Law in 1926. He is a member of the Denver, Colo-
rado and American Bar Associations and served 'as president of the
Denver Bar in 1953-1954. He is a member of the firm of Wormwood,
O'Dell and Wolvington.
At the 1959 midwinter meeting of the American Bar Association
the House of Delegates adopted a resolution to the effect that the
"Clients' Security Fund" deserved the support of the legal profes-
sion and should be studied by the various state bar associations
throughout the country. In accordance with this recommendation
President Douglas McHendrie of the Colorado Bar Association ap-
pointed a committee to investigate this matter and report to the
Board of Governors at its September meeting.
The committee appointed by President McHendrie is composed
of Charles Corlett from Monte Vista; Robert Christensen, Loveland;
Lyle Miller, Golden; Ralph E. Waldo, Jr., Greeley; Ira Rothgerber,
Jr. and David Knowlton, both from Denver; and the writer of this
article. While the members of the committee have been furnished
with material to study this proposed fund, there has not yet been a
committee meeting. Consequently this article should not be consid-
ered in any manner a report from the committee. It is written sim-
ply to advise the members of the Colorado bar what such a fund is,
the desirability of such a fund, and how such a fund would work.
I hasten to state that the opinions of the writer are not necessarily
those of the committee. Its opinions and recommendations will
come at a later date, after due consideration.
I am sure that the first question that enters an attorney's mind
is: "Just what is a 'Clients' Security Fund'?" And the second ques-
tion is: "Why the necessity for such a fund?"
The legal profession is an honored profession. We who are at-
torneys are proud of our profession. Unfortunately, there are many
members of the public who do not share our faith and belief in our
profession. In many instances this disregard, even disrespect, of at-
torneys has been brought about by various paper-backed "who-
dunits," television shows and the like. So, too, the newspapers,
unfortunately, have added to this opinion of the attorney. The hard-
working, honest attorney who labors hard and long for his clients
and scrupulously accounts to them for all of their funds which pass
through his hands, is not "news." It is the occasional unscrupulous
attorney who embezzles his clients' funds that the public hears of.
Fortunately, this number is small, but it is the "bad apple that
spoils the bushel" as far as the general public is concerned.
True, the embezzling attorney may be disbarred, but that is
small satisfaction to the client who may have lost his life's savings.
Attorneys in general owe a duty to see that no member of the public
loses by reason of misplacing confidence in a legal "rotten apple."
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In 1953 Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School gave an ad-
dress to the Cleveland Bar Association in which he said: "Would it
not be a fine thing if bar associations ... established an insurance
fund which would guarantee, as a professional and association mat-
ter, that no client would suffer loss through the defalcation of his
lawyer?"
Chief Justice Vanderbilt in 1955 said:
"It is in the public interest that the legal profession
which includes the judges and the law teachers as well as
the practicing lawyers should control legal education and
admissions to the bar.
"It is in the public interest that the legal profession
should control the discipline and disbarment of lawyers.
"The public holds the organized bar responsible for the
conduct of all members of the legal profession so long as
they are members of the legal profession."'
This is a responsibility that we as attorneys, individually and as
an association, should not shirk. The "Clients' Security Fund" is an
answer to the problem of the defaulting attorney. While the estab-
lishment of such a fund would tend to create better public relations,
the main reason for such a fund is that the public looks to the pro-
fession to include only men of honesty and integrity. When a mem-
ber has broken the faith placed in him, the profession as a whole,
and not the victimized client, should pay.
Only in this way can we hold our heads high and say to the
public: "We will not countenance a thief who has been admitted to
our honored profession; we will see that he is disbarred and that no
client shall suffer financial loss by reason of our having allowed him
to practice in the first place."
While the idea of a "Clients' Security Fund" is rather new in
this country, such funds have been in existence among the bars of
other countries for some time. The first such fund originated in
New Zealand in 1929. This was followed by similar funds in New
South Wales and the State of Victoria, both in Australia, in 1946.
Most Canadian provinces now have such funds. Other countries in
which such funds have been adopted in one form or another are
England, Union of South Africa, Scotland, Ireland and Denmark.
Here in the United States, Vermont and Oregon are the only
two states to have established such funds. In Vermont this is taken
care of through an insurance policy, while in Oregon, which has an
integrated bar, the fund is maintained by the association. At this
time I do not believe it advisable to go into the merits of the two
systems. That will come later with the report of our committee.
As an example, however, I wish to call attention to the Vermont
plan. Vermont does not have an integrated bar-all members of the
Vermont Bar Association are voluntary members, just as we are
in Colorado. At a cost of two dollars per member an insurance com-
pany has issued a policy covering defalcations of attorneys in that
state. The maximum coverage for any one attorney is $10,000 and
1 80 A.B.A. Rep. 328 (1955).
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there is a maximum coverage of $100,000 for the entire bar in any
one year. Before the insurance company is liable, after proper proof
of the defalcation, the defaulting attorney must have either died or
been disbarred.
Many problems regarding this fund will be confronted by your
committee. Some of these are: The limit to be paid on any one
claim. Who shall have power to decide, if it is a fund separate and
apart from an insurance policy, as to whether a claim should be paid
in full, or in part, or rejected entirely? Should the fund be limited
to a strictly attorney-client relationship and exclude losses arising
from business transactions with an attorney? How should each
attorney be assessed annually for this fund?
One of the most vexing problems will be whether or not the
fund should apply only to defaulting attorneys who are members
of the bar association. I am sure that many attorneys will ask:
"Why should we carry the freight for attorneys who are not mem-
bers of the association?" While there is logic to such a question,
there is some argument in favor of the fund covering all defaulting
attorneys admitted to practice in Colorado.
A survey by Martindale-Hub bell disclosed that in 1958, fifty-two
attorneys were disbarred for embezzlement in the United States.
Only five of these were members of the American Bar Association.
I assume that some of the others were members of state bar associa-
tions, but I have no figures as to this. This indicates, however, that
it may be the clients of some non-members of the association who
may need the protection. To these clients and to the public in gen-
eral the fact that the embezzler is a non-member of the association
makes no difference. He is still an attorney who has broken his oath
and has stolen from his client.
As will be seen, the number of attorneys who have been dis-
barred for embezzlement is small when considering the membership
as a whole. Reginald Heber Smith, in a recent article, 2 estimated
that the number of attorneys disbarred for embezzlement in the
years 1956-57 amounted to only .002 per cent of the bar. This speaks
well for the bar as a whole. But the remaining members of the bar
will be spoken of more highly if we see that the clients of that .002
per cent do not suffer financial loss. Disbarment is not enough.
As stated by Theodore Voorhees, Chairman of the American
Bar Association's Special Committee on Clients' Security Fund:
"[T] he clients' security fund should not be regarded merely
as a matter of charity: it is the discharge of a professional debt
and a debt we should recognize as one of honor.. .."
The Special Committee on Clients' Security Fund of the Ameri-
can Bar Association has published a guide fir the establishment of
such a fund. In this guide the Committee has set forth some argu-
ments against such a fund and some of the answers to such argu-
ments. I take the liberty to quote therefrom:
2 R. Smith, The Clients' Security Fund: "A Debt of Honor Owed by the Profession," 44 A.B.A.J.
125 (1958).
a Voorhees, The Case for the Client's Security Fund, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 155, 158 (1959).
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"(1) Why should lawyers who are not guilty of em-
bezzlement pay the debts of those who are?
"The fact is that whether or not a fund is adopted, the
overwhelming majority of honorable lawyers will in fact
pay for the defalcations made by their erring brothers, since
they will pay in terms of loss of respect and honor to the
profession as a whole. The public will hold us accountable
for the guilty few and while the loss to the other members
of the Bar may not be immediate, it will be certain and it
will be great in the long run. The Clients' Security Fund is
a debt of honor of our profession.
"(2) Is the Fund really needed? Are there enough
cases of embezzlement to warrant its adoption?
"The figures for the past three years indicate that dis-
barments in the whole country average a little more than
one lawyer for each state each year. While this amounts to
.002% of the total membership of the bar, it does indicate a
need for the fund which is country wide. The damage
which is done to the good name of the profession whenever
an embezzlement by a lawyer occurs is out of all proportion
to the size or frequency of the event.
"(3) Would the establishment of a fund be consid-
ered by the public to be an admission of guilt by the legal
profession?
"The experience of the banking profession with F.D.I.C.
should show the lack of basis for this fear. It has also been
pointed out that the airlines advertise that planes are
equipped with radar and do not fear that the public will
take panic with the thought of blind landings.
"(4) Would a fund be too expensive?
"That of Vermont requires financial support at the rate
of two dollars per member of the bar. Studies which have
been made indicate that a five dollar annual contribution
should prove large enough to provide for the establishment
of the fund, although experience will, of course, differ from
state to state.
"(5) Would a limitation on the amount paid to a
claimant out of the fund offset the benefits to be derived
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from it because of disappointment that the claim was not
paid in full?
"Obviously, the best public relations will be achieved
when all legitimate claims are paid in full. However, there
is no reason to suppose that the public would be resentful
over part payments, particularly in the early years of a
fund. Statistics from every part of the country show that
the vast majority of embezzlements by lawyers do not in-
volve large amounts, and the main purpose of the fund
should be to protect people of modest means whose losses,
though relatively small, are often disastrous to them. Their
claims would be paid in full.
"(6) Is the fund idea socialistic?
"This argument has been made against virtually every
worthwhile co-operative effort that the Bar has made in
the past twenty-five years. The same assertion has been
made against Legal Aid and the Lawyer Referral Service.
The idea of the fund is no more socialistic than workmen's
compensation or any other group indemnification plan."
As has been stated, this is a debt of honor. Now is the time for
us to meet this debt of honor. Let us show to the people of Colorado
the Colorado attorney in his true light-honest, responsible, gener-
ous and a man of his word.
Patronize
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